Reexamining What We Stand to Lose: A Look at Reinitiated Consultation Under the Endangered Species Act by Kanatas, Catherine E. & Smith, Maxwell C.
Pace Environmental Law Review
Volume 32
Issue 1 Winter 2015 Article 4
January 2015
Reexamining What We Stand to Lose: A Look at
Reinitiated Consultation Under the Endangered
Species Act
Catherine E. Kanatas
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Maxwell C. Smith
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr
Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, and the Natural
Resources Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace
Environmental Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Catherine E. Kanatas and Maxwell C. Smith, Reexamining What We Stand to Lose: A Look at
Reinitiated Consultation Under the Endangered Species Act, 32 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 225 (2015)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss1/4
4_KANATAS&SMITH FINAL 8/24/2015 12:06 PM 
 
225 
ARTICLE 
Reexamining What We Stand to Lose: A Look 
at Reinitiated Consultation Under the 
Endangered Species Act 
CATHERINE E. KANATAS* AND MAXWELL C. SMITH** 
 
Nothing is more priceless and more worthy of preservation than 
the rich array of animal life with which our country has been 
blessed. It is a many-faceted treasure, of value to scholars, 
scientists, and nature lovers alike, and it forms a vital part of the 
heritage we all share as Americans.  
–Richard Nixon1 
 
* Catherine E. Kanatas is an attorney at the United States Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) and primarily represents the NRC Staff in 
contested nuclear reactor proceedings. Mrs. Kanatas also clerked for the 
Attorney General of Georgia and served as a research assistant at the 
University of Georgia, where she graduated cum laude in 2009. Before law 
school, Mrs. Kanatas worked in the education research field. She would like to 
thank her husband and daughter who are the love of her life and sunshine, 
respectively. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author 
and do not necessarily represent the positions of the NRC. 
** Maxwell C. Smith is an attorney at the NRC, where he currently serves 
as the Legal Counsel to NRC Commissioner, Kristine L. Svinicki. Prior to 
working with Commissioner Svinicki, the primary focus of his practice was 
representing the staff of the NRC in contested adjudicatory proceedings on 
applications to renew nuclear reactor operating licenses. Mr. Smith has also 
clerked for the Hon. Jackson L. Kiser in the Western District of Virginia and the 
Hon. Charles E. Poston and Hon. Lydia C. Taylor in the Norfolk Circuit Court. 
He graduated from Washington and Lee University, magna cum laude in 2005 
where he contributed to the Capital Defense Journal. As always, he would like 
to thank his incredible wife, Angela, daughter, Jasmine, and son, Raj, for their 
laughter and love. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the 
author and do not necessarily represent the positions of the NRC. The authors 
would also like to thank Tison Campbell, Sean Croston, Anita Ghosh, and 
Briana Grange for their invaluable input. This article is dedicated to the 
memory of Lauren Woodall Roady, whose love of learning, the law, and nature 
continues to inspire the NRC’s attorneys. 
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For more than three decades, the Endangered Species Act has 
successfully protected our nation’s most threatened wildlife, and 
we should be looking for ways to improve it—not weaken it.  
–Barack Obama2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Catastrophic. That is the claim from both sides in 
Endangered Species Act (ESA) litigation. On the one hand, 
interests as critical as national defense can be imperiled by 
vigorous application of the ESA.3  On the other hand, an entire 
species could become extinct if the law is not strictly applied.4  
There is little room for error in either scenario.5  So who wins? 
Who loses? And at what point are an agency’s duties under the 
ESA over? 
Most Federal agencies ensure ESA compliance through 
consultation with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and 
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) (collectively the 
Service), as required by section 7 of the ESA.6  Given the high 
 
 1. 374 - Statement on Signing the Endangered Species Act of 1973, December 
28, 1973, AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Nov. 10, 2014, 6:30 PM), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=4090. 
 2. Remarks by the President to Commemorate the 160 Anniversary of the 
Department of the Interior, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Nov. 10, 2014, 6:38 PM), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-commemorate-
160th-anniversary-department-interior. 
 3. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Evans, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1138 
(N.D. Cal. 2003) (discussing the Navy’s need to conduct sonar training and 
testing for national security purposes). 
 4. See id. at 1188-89 (discussing gray whales and some populations of 
endangered sea turtles). 
 5. See Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 954 F.2d 1441, 1443 (9th Cir. 
1992) (“This is a case about difficult choices. In 1988, Congress was asked to 
choose between ensuring that our nation remains a world leader in 
astrophysical research or protecting from almost certain demise an endangered 
species on the brink of extinction.”). 
 6. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2012) (“Each Federal 
agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary 
[elsewhere defined as NMFS and FWS], insure that any action authorized, 
funded, or carried out by such agency (hereinafter in this section referred to as 
an ‘agency action’) is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss1/4
4_KANATAS&SMITH FINAL 8/24/2015  12:06 PM 
2015 ESA: REINITIATED CONSULTATION 227 
 
stakes of complying with the ESA, it is not surprising that ESA 
consultation is the subject of considerable litigation and 
commentary.7  However, reinitiated consultation, renewed 
consultation required when circumstances underlying the initial 
consultation materially change, has similar consequences.8  But, 
there is little case law or academic research examining when an 
agency must reinitiate consultation and the consequences if the 
agency improperly fails to reinitiate.9  Moreover, unlike the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), where the procedural 
requirements to prepare an environmental impact statement end 
when the agency takes its federal action,10 the ESA’s 
implementing regulations11 contemplate reinitiated consultation 
even years after an agency acts.12  Thus, under the ESA’s terms 
and implementing regulations, once a species is listed as 
endangered or threatened, it is protected now and into the future, 
even if that protection comes at a high cost to society. 
Additionally, the listing of a new species can trigger an 
entirely new set of reinitiated consultations for an otherwise-
complete federal action.13  Currently, the Service is considering 
 
endangered species or threatened species . . . .”); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15); 
50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b) (2014).  
 7. See, e.g., Jeremy Brian Root, Limiting the Scope of Reinitiation: 
Reforming Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1035 
(2002) (describing the ESA’s consultation process as complex, lengthy, and 
highly litigated). 
 8. 50 C.F.R. § 402.16. 
 9. The following articles primarily constitute the existing literature: see 
Deborah Freeman, Reinitiation of ESA Section 7 Consultation over Existing 
Projects, in THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY AND PERSPECTIVES 115 
(Donald C. Baur & William Robert Irvin eds., 2002); Root, supra note 7, at 1035. 
 10. See, e.g., Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 371 (1989) 
(noting that the requirement to supplement environmental impact statements 
exists when an agency has yet to act and discovers new and significant 
information). 
 11. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 401-53. 
 12. § 402.16(d). For example, the regulations require reinitiation of formal 
consultation when the agency retains some discretionary involvement or control 
over an action and a new species is listed that may be affected by the action. The 
Act also provides extensive protection to all listed species regardless of whether 
a consultation occurs under section 7. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538. 
 13. 50 C.F.R. § 402.16(d). 
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whether to list many more species.14  Thus, more and more 
requests to reinitiate consultations appear likely. As a result, 
understanding the legal basis, power, limits, and consequences of 
reinitiated consultation is more critical than ever. 
This article first examines the role reinitiated consultation 
plays within Congress’s statutory framework and concludes that 
in many ways, reinitiated consultation is the glue that holds the 
ESA’s protective scheme together.15  While the ESA generally 
prohibits any injury to an endangered species, Congress has 
authorized the Service to permit such injuries under certain 
circumstances.16  But these authorizations must be accompanied 
by a limit that will trigger reinitiated consultation if exceeded. 
Thus, without reinitiated consultation, these preauthorized 
injuries or “takes” would prove gaping leaks in Congress’s 
“Ark,”17 leaving little or no safety for endangered species. 
Moreover, reinitiated consultation has significant real world 
consequences for federal agencies and private parties.18  Failure 
to reinitiate consultation when legally required can subject the 
agency and its employees, as well as private parties, to civil and 
even criminal liability. 
Next, this article explores the legal basis for reinitiated 
consultation.19  Despite its central role, Congress never provided 
 
 14. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Review of Native 
Species that are Candidates for Listing as Endangered or Threatened; Annual 
Notice of Findings on Resubmitted Petitions; Annual Description of Progress on 
Listing Actions, 78 Fed. Reg. 70,104 (Nov. 22, 2013) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. 
pt.17) (noting that “the current number of species that are candidates for listing 
is 146”). Some of these species are very prevalent at or near power plants or 
other major industrial installations operated by private entities under federal 
licenses and permits. 
 15. See infra Part III.A. (discussing protective elements of the ESA and the 
role of reinitiated consultation). 
 16. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4) (empowering the Service to provide an “Incidental 
Take Statement” authorizing a limited number of takes for a federal project). An 
“Incidental Take,” or “take that results from a Federal action but is not the 
purpose of the action” may be allowed if the Service “finds that an action may 
adversely affect a species, but not jeopardize its continued existence” and then 
prepares and approves the “Incidental Take Statement.” Section 7 Consultation: 
A Brief Explanation, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV. (last updated June 30, 2014), 
available at http://www.fws.gov/midwest/endangered/section7/section7.html. 
 17. See § 1536(b)(4). 
 18. See infra Part III.B. 
 19. See infra Part IV. 
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for reinitiated consultation within the Act itself.20  While the 
Service has acknowledged this silence,21 the courts generally do 
not raise this question of statutory authority.22  In light of the 
ambiguities within the ESA and Congress’s clear direction in the 
legislative history of the Act that it intended for agencies to 
reinitiate consultation, this article concludes that the practice is 
legally supportable. 
Finally, given the significance of reinitiated consultation, and 
the likelihood that it is here to stay, this article then explores how 
courts have reviewed suits concerning reinitiated consultation.23  
This discussion highlights potential challenges and best practices 
for federal agencies and permittees. This article concludes that, 
with few exceptions, courts have taken a surprisingly deferential 
approach to reviewing agency decisions to reinitiate, or more 
commonly not reinitiate, consultation. For example, courts have 
allowed agencies to expand a project’s scope, duration, or impact 
on listed species or to recalculate how to measure the impacts 
altogether without requiring reinitiated consultation.24  
Nonetheless, courts have taken a much stricter approach when 
considering the triggers for reinitiated consultation and have 
frequently insisted that those triggers be as meaningful and as 
exact as possible.25 
However, before discussing reinitiated consultation in detail, 
this article provides some additional background on the ESA in 
general and reinitiated consultation in particular. To understand 
the purpose and effect of reinitiated consultation, one must first 
understand several key ESA provisions – namely, the ESA’s 
listing, liability, and consultation provisions. 
 
 20. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (entirely omitting the word “reinitiate”). 
 21. Interagency Cooperation—Endangered Species Act of 1973, as Amended; 
Final Rule, 51 Fed. Reg. 19,926, 19,956 (June 3, 1986) (to be codified at 50 
C.F.R. pt. 402). 
 22. Pac. Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(assuming that the ESA requires reinitiated as well as initial consultation). 
 23. See infra Part V. 
 24. See infra Part V.B. 
 25. See infra Part V.A.3. 
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II. BACKGROUND ON THE ESA’S KEY PROVISIONS 
RELATED TO CONSULTATION AND 
REINITIATED CONSULTATION 
If you read the preamble to the ESA26 and believe the 
Supreme Court,27 you would conclude that the ESA protects 
endangered species at any cost.28  There is certainly evidence of 
this: just ask the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)29 or loggers 
in the Pacific Northwest.30  The ESA is called the “pit bull of 
environmental laws”31 for good reason. Unlike NEPA, the ESA 
has substantive requirements in addition to procedural 
requirements.32  These requirements are extensive33 and 
 
 26. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2012). 
 27. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill (TVA), 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978) (noting that 
the plain intent of Congress in enacting the ESA was to halt and reverse the 
trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost). 
 28. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (emphasis added); Endangered Species 
Conservation Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275, 275-83 (1969) 
(prohibiting transportation of endangered species). In contrast, the ESA 
“provide[s] a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and 
threatened species depend may be conserved.” Id. (emphasis added); 
Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926, 
926-29 (1966) (authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to purchase lands for 
purposes of preserving endangered species); TVA, 437 U.S. at 180 (The Supreme 
Court has observed, “[a]s it was finally passed, the Endangered Species Act of 
1973 represented the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of 
endangered species ever enacted by any nation.”). Previous laws protecting 
endangered species were far more limited; for example they empowered the 
executive to create sanctuaries for endangered species or restricted 
transportation of those species. 
 29. See TVA, 437 U.S. 153. The ESA famously led to the Supreme Court’s 
TVA decision that halted construction of a nearly complete, multi-million-dollar 
Federal dam. 
 30. Candee Wilde, Evaluating the Endangered Species Act: Trends in Mega-
Petitions, Judicial Review, and Budget Constraints Reveal a Costly Dilemma for 
Species Conservation, 25 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 307, 324-35 (2014). Since the Service 
named the Northern Spotted Owl as a listed species pursuant to the ESA, “over 
two hundred logging mills in the Pacific Northwest have closed and thousands of 
logging employees have lost their jobs.” Id. at 324. 
 31. Id. at 310. It has also been called the “Magna Carta of the environmental 
movement.” WATER ON THE EDGE (Water Education Foundation 2005) (interview 
with Kevin Starr at 29:12). 
 32. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349-50 
(1989). “NEPA itself does not mandate particular results.” Id. at 350. Instead, 
NEPA imposes only procedural requirements to “ensure[] that the agency . . . 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss1/4
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compliance with them can cost agencies and individuals delay 
(with corresponding costs) or even stop projects in their tracks if a 
protected species would be jeopardized. Moreover, violations of 
ESA requirements can result in large civil or criminal penalties.34 
But the real story is not that simple. By the plain terms of 
the ESA, endangered species sometimes lose because “takes”35 
are permitted by the statute.36  Further, the ESA’s procedural 
and substantive requirements do not guarantee that a species 
will flourish.37  In fact, the Service has only de-listed thirty-two 
species for reasons of recovery out of the hundreds of species 
listed in the Act’s nearly thirty-year history.38  And, unlike many 
environmental laws, which tend to have a decreasing impact on 
the American economy as industry conforms to new 
environmental standards, the ESA’s impact increases each year 
 
carefully consider[ed], detailed information concerning significant 
environmental impacts.” Id. at 359. 
 33. Root, supra note 7, at 1036 (noting commenters have described 
completing the consultation process as a “bottomless bureaucratic morass”). 
 34. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540. 
 35. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2012) (defining take as “to harass, harm, pursue, 
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any 
such conduct” regarding protected species). “Harm,” in this context, is “an act 
which actually kills or injures wildlife. Such act may include significant habitat 
modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by 
significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, 
feeding or sheltering.” Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or. 
(Sweet Home), 515 U.S. 687, 691 (1995) citing 50 C.F.R. § 17.3. 
 36. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4). 
 37. Wilde, supra note 30, at 324-25 (noting that the Northern Spotted Owl 
population has remained stagnant, even after listing). Though the Supreme 
Court’s decision in TVA halted the Tellico dam project, the dam was later built 
after an act of Congress. Shannon Petersen, Congress and Charismatic 
Megafauna: A Legislative History of the Endangered Species Act, 29 ENVTL. L. 
463, 486 (1999) (“Ironically, however, soon after the dam's completion, FWS 
discovered healthy populations of snail darters in other Tennessee rivers and 
down-listed the species from endangered to threatened.”). 
 38. See Delisting Report, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., http://ecos.fws.gov/ 
tess_public/reports/delisting-report (last visited Jan. 12, 2015); see also Steven 
P. Quarles & Thomas R. Lundquist, The Pronounced Presence and Insistent 
Issues of the Endangered Species Act, SP036 ALI-ABA 447, 454 (2009) (noting 
that, as of 2009, the Service had only de-listed twenty five of the hundreds of 
species listed in the Act’s nearly thirty year history). 
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as sprawling development pushes construction into new 
habitats.39 
A. Listing a Species Under the ESA 
The ESA’s primary purpose is to protect and recover 
imperiled species and the ecosystems upon which they depend.40  
The ESA’s protections include section 7 conservation and 
consultation requirements and section 9 protections against 
takes. But before a species can receive the protection provided by 
the ESA, the species must be listed as an endangered or 
threatened species.41  Thus, how the ESA defines endangered and 
threatened species and how species are listed have critical 
ramifications.42 
Section 3 of the ESA provides definitions for species, 
endangered species, and threatened species. Under section 3, 
“species” includes “any subspecies of fish or wildlife or plants, and 
any distinct population segment of any species of vertebrate fish 
or wildlife which interbreeds when mature.”43  Thus, a species for 
ESA purposes can be a true taxonomic species, a subspecies, or in 
the case of vertebrates, a distinct population segment. 
An endangered species is defined as “any species which is in 
danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its 
range.”44  A threatened species is defined as “any species which is 
 
 39. See generally Quarles & Lundquist, supra note 38. 
 40. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (“The purposes of this chapter are to provide a means 
whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species 
depend may be conserved, to provide a program for the conservation of such 
endangered species and threatened species, and to take such steps as may be 
appropriate to achieve the purposes of the treaties and conventions set forth in 
subsection (a) of this section.”). See also Listing and Critical Habitat: Overview, 
U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV. (last updated Jul. 31, 2014), https://www.fws.gov/ 
endangered/what-we-do/listing-overview.html. 
 41. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b). 
 42. This article does not extensively discuss the delisting of species. For more 
information on that topic, see Kurtis A. Kemper, Delisting of Species Protected 
Under Endangered Species Act, 54 A.L.R. FED. 2D 607 (2011). 
 43. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16). 
 44. Id. § 1532(6). The statute provides an exception to this; specifically, “a 
species of the Class Insecta determined by the Secretary to constitute a pest 
whose protection under the provisions of this chapter would present an 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss1/4
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likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable 
future throughout all or a significant portion of its range.”45 
Section 4 provides for the listing of endangered and 
threatened species.46  As noted above, the FWS and NMFS share 
responsibilities for administering the ESA.47  The FWS has 
jurisdiction over land and freshwater species.48  NMFS has 
jurisdiction over marine species and anadromous species (fish 
that swim up river to spawn).49 
Species can be listed in one of two ways: the Service can list a 
species by rule, using a candidate assessment process50 or an 
individual can petition for a species to be listed.51  To be 
considered for listing, the species must meet one of five factors in 
ESA section 4(a)(1): 
(A) the present or threatened destruction, modification, or 
curtailment of its habitat or range; 
(B) overutilization for commercial, recreational, scientific, or 
educational purposes; 
(C) [declining population due to] disease or predation; 
 
overwhelming and overriding risk to man” is not considered an endangered 
species. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6). 
 45. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20). 
 46. See id. § 1533. Section 4 also provides for the designation of critical 
habitat. Id.; see also Ann K. Wooster, Designation of “Critical Habitat” Under 
Endangered Species Act, 176 A.L.R. FED. 405 (2002). 
 47. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15); 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b) (2014). 
 48. 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b); see also Endangered Species Act, NAT’L OCEANIC & 
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/laws/esa/ (last visited Nov. 5, 
2014) (“Generally, [NMFS] manage[s] marine species, while []FWS manages 
land and freshwater species.”). These species are listed at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h) 
and 50 C.F.R. § 17.12(h). The critical habitats are found in 50 C.F.R. § 17.95, 50 
C.F.R. § 17.96, and 50 C.F.R. Part 226. 
 49. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b); Endangered and Threatened Marine Species 
under NMFS' Jurisdiction, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., 
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/species/esa/listed.htm#fish (last updated Jan. 15, 
2015); see also Endangered Species Act, supra note 48 (noting that NMFS has 
jurisdiction over 102 listed species). 
 50. See 50 C.F.R. § 424.15(b) (2014). Under section 4, the Secretaries of the 
Department of the Interior and Commerce, whose departments include FWS 
and NMFS respectively, work together to list threatened and endangered 
species. Id.; see also 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b). 
 51. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A) (2012); 50 C.F.R. § 424.14(a). The procedures 
are the same for both types of listing except that there is a 90-day screening 
period for petitions. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A). 
9
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(D) the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms [for 
preservation]; or 
(E) other natural or manmade factors affecting its continued 
existence.52 
If the current condition of a species meets one or more of 
these factors, it is considered a candidate for listing. Under the 
ESA’s implementing regulations on listing, a “candidate” species 
is “any species being considered by the Secretary for listing as an 
endangered or a threatened species, but not yet the subject of a 
proposed rule.”53  Importantly, “[u]nlisted species, species 
petitioned by citizens for listing, species which the Federal 
government has termed ‘candidates’54 for listing, or even species 
which the federal government has proposed to list, do not receive 
any of the substantive protections of the Act.”55  Therefore, the 
Service’s listing decisions are highly scrutinized56 and 
controversial.57 
 
 52. 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (a)(1). 
 53. 50 C.F.R § 424.02(b). 
 54. See id. There is a conference requirement imposed on agencies related to 
candidate species. See Ala. Power Co. v. FERC, 979 F.2d 1561, 1564 (D.C. Cir. 
1992). 
 55. Jay Tutchton, Listing and Critical Habitat Decisions and Related Issues 
Under Section 4 of the Endangered Species Act, 2012 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 
7B, 7B-1. 
 56. 16 U.S.C. § 1533. Under the ESA, the public may participate in the 
informal rulemaking for listing decisions and designation of critical habitat. 
Additionally, courts have allowed organizations to enforce the ESA on behalf of 
a species. E.g,. N. Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479, 480 (W.D. Wash. 
1988) (Sierra Club could represent interests of Northern Spotted Owl in 
challenging failure of FWS to list the owl); see Constance E. Brooks, Challenging 
Agency Action and Inaction: the Problem of Leading a Horse to Water, 2004 
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 12A. Thus, petitioners can and do sue under the 
Administrative Procedure Act to compel action on the listing of candidate 
species. But see Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177 (1997) (right to sue is 
limited to litigants seeking to protect the species). 
 57. Spear, 520 U.S. 154. This article does not discuss these controversies. For 
some examples of listing controversies: see Hodel, 716 F. Supp. at 479; see also 
Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 174 F.3d 1178, 1186 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding 
unreasonable delay in listing decision, given statutory requirement to make a 
listing decision within one year after a petition is filed); Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. 
Babbitt, 73 F.3d 867, 871 (9th Cir. 1995); Biodiversity Legal Found. v. Babbitt, 
63 F. Supp. 2d 31, 35 (D.D.C. 1999). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss1/4
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The only consideration in the listing process is the biological 
status of the species, based on the best scientific and commercial 
data available.58  Economic factors cannot be considered during 
the listing process.59  Potential candidate species are then 
prioritized, with any potential “emergency listing” given the 
highest priority, including species that face a “significant risk to 
the well-being of any species.”60 
The Service’s current list of candidate species is published in 
the Federal Register61 and on the FWS’ and NMFS’s websites.62  
Several of these candidate species live at or near existing major 
industrial facilities.63  Thus, listing these species could have a 
substantial impact on American infrastructure. Moreover, the 
Service has entered into settlement agreements with petitioners 
that have already resulted in the listing of dozens of new 
species.64  As discussed in more detail below, if a new candidate 
 
 58. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(8) (2014); see 
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife; Final Listing Priority Guidance for Fiscal 
Year 2000, 64 Fed. Reg. 57,114 (Oct. 22, 1999). Congress amended the ESA in 
1982 by adding the word “solely" to prevent any consideration other than the 
biological status of the species. See infra Part IV. In doing so, Congress rejected 
President Ronald Reagan's Executive Order 12291, which required economic 
analysis of all government agency actions. See generally Exec. Order No. 12,291, 
46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981). 
 59. 50 C.F.R. § 424.11(b). Previously, the ESA allowed for consideration of 
economic impact when designating critical habitat, but the ESA was 
subsequently amended. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2). 
 60. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(7); see also Endangered and Listed Species; Listing 
and Recovery Priority Guidelines, 55 Fed. Reg. 24,296 (June 15, 1990). 
 61. Annual Description of Progress on Listing Actions, 78 Fed. Reg. 70,104, 
70,106 (Nov. 22, 2013) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt.17). 
 62. Candidate Species Report, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 
http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/pub/candidateSpecies.jsp (last visited Oct. 8, 
2014); Proactive Conservation Program: Species of Concern, NAT’L MARINE 
FISHERIES SERV., http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/species/concern/ (last updated 
Dec. 23, 2014). 
 63. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; 12-Month Finding 
on a Petition to List Eriogonum kelloggi (Red Mountain buckwheat) and Sedum 
eastwoodiae (Red Mountain stonecrop) as Endangered or Threatened Species, 79 
Fed. Reg. 56,029, 56,038 (Sep. 18, 2014) (noting that mining activities were 
evaluated, but found not to disturb species); see, e.g., Endangered and 
Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Endangered Species Act Listing Determination 
for Alewife and Blueback Herring, 78 Fed. Reg. 48,944, 48,956-57 (Aug. 12, 
2013) (noting that herring occur within the vicinity of power plants). 
 64. See generally Federico Cheever, Greater Sage-Grouse, Lesser Prairie-
Chickens, and Dunes Sagebrush Lizards: Developments in the Courts, Federal 
11
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species is listed,65 the species receives many protections under 
the ESA, and a Federal agency taking action is required to 
consult and may be required to reinitiate formal consultation 
with the Service.66  Moreover, interested members of the public 
may seek to enjoin activities based on an agency’s failure to 
initiate formal consultation or to adequately reinitiate 
consultation. 
B. Sections 9 and 11: No Takes . . . or Else 
Once listed, a species enjoys substantial protection from 
human encroachment under section 9 of the ESA.67  Section 9 of 
the ESA declares that “with respect to any endangered species of 
fish or wildlife listed pursuant to section 1533 of this title it is 
unlawful for any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States to . . . take any such species within the United States or 
the territorial sea of the United States.”68  The ESA defines a 
“take” as a “means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, 
kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such 
conduct” and person to be any “individual, corporation, 
partnership, trust, association, or any other private entity.”69  
Based on these expansive definitions, section 9 prohibits almost 
any entity, including both private entities and government 
agencies, from undertaking nearly any activity that could hurt an 
endangered species in any way. 
Moreover, the ESA does not just prohibit taking endangered 
species on paper. Section 11 provides for civil and criminal 
 
Agencies, and the States Regarding Imperiled But Not (Yet?) Listed Species, 58 
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 23.01 (2012) (discussing two settlement agreements 
entered into by the Service and petitioners). Importantly, “the court settlements 
themselves do not generally require listing. Rather, they require . . . FWS to 
make decisions that species listing is either warranted or not warranted and to 
follow through on those decisions.” Id. § 23.06, at 23-18. 
 65. See Endangered Species Act (ESA), NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC 
ADMIN., http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/laws/esa/ (last updated Oct. 10, 2014) 
(noting that currently there are approximately 2,195 species listed under the 
ESA). 
 66. See infra Parts II.C-D. 
 67. See generally 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. § 1532(13), (19). 
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penalties for violations of the ESA, including section 9; the 
penalties include fines of up to $50,000 and up to one year 
imprisonment.70  Moreover, section 9(g) of the ESA permits 
citizen suits to enjoin activities that violate the Act’s provisions.71  
Thus, federal agencies, as well as everyone else, have a strong 
incentive to avoid ESA violations. 
C. Listing Triggers Initial Consultation Under ESA 
Section 7 
Once listed, a species is also protected by the ESA’s section 7 
consultation requirement.72  The ESA’s consultation 
requirements apply only to federal agencies, not private 
individuals or states.73  These consultation requirements allow an 
agency to avail itself of the Service’s expertise in assessing the 
impact of the proposed project and the feasibility of adopting 
reasonable alternatives.74 
Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA requires that each federal agency 
consult with the Secretary of Commerce or the Interior to “insure 
that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency 
. . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any 
endangered species or threatened species.”75 
 
 70. 16 U.S.C. § 1540. 
 71. Id. § 1540(g). 
 72. Id. § 1536(b)(4). As discussed in more detail below, section 7 is also the 
mechanism agencies use to acquire authorization for take of listed species. See 
Peg Romanik & John C. Martin, Take Under the Endangered Species Act, 2012 
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 8A. Section 7 also provides agencies a procedure to 
apply to the Endangered Species Committee to exempt a project from the ESA. 
See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)-(p); see generally Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Endangered 
Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534 (9th Cir. 1993) (discussing Committee's role). 
 73. See Devon Lea Damiano, Licensed to Kill: A Defense of Vicarious Liability 
Under the Endangered Species Act, 63 DUKE L.J. 1543, 1558 (2014). 
 74. See Ky. Heartwood, Inc. v. Worthington, 20 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1084 n.8 
(E.D. Ky. 1998); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1536; 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.13, 402.14, 402.16 
(2014). 
 75. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). See also 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(a), (b) (“If the subject 
species is cited in 50 CFR 222.23(a) or 227.4, the Federal agency shall contact 
the NMFS. For all other listed species the Federal Agency shall contact the 
FWS.”); 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (“Jeopardize the continued existence of means to 
engage in an action that reasonably would be expected, directly or indirectly, to 
reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a listed 
13
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As the FWS has explained, the ESA contains several 
provisions designed to facilitate and expedite consultation: 
First, Section 7(c) provides that each federal agency shall . . . 
request information from the Secretary of the Interior or 
Commerce whether any listed species is present in the area of the 
proposed action. If the Secretary advises that such species may 
be present, the agency undertaking the action shall conduct a 
biological assessment for the purpose of identifying any listed 
species “which is likely to be affected by such action.” . . . [A]fter 
the conclusion of consultation, the Secretary shall provide the 
federal agency with an opinion [biological opinion or (BiOp)] 
“detailing how the agency action affects the species or its critical 
habitat[;]” if the Secretary finds jeopardy to the species or 
adverse modification of critical habitat, the Secretary shall 
suggest reasonable and prudent alternatives that he believes 
would not violate Section 7(a)(2).76  
If there is a finding of jeopardy, the agency must modify or 
abandon its proposal.77  If there’s a finding of no jeopardy, but the 
project is likely to result in incidental takings of listed species, 
the Service issues an Incidental Take Statement (ITS) with the 
BiOp.78  The ITS provides terms and conditions that, if complied 
with, will shield the agency and any applicant from section 9 
liability.79  Additionally, private entities may apply for an 
Incidental Take Permit (ITP) under section 10 of the ESA, which 
has a similar, but more limited, effect.80  While parties are not 
 
species in the wild by reducing the reproduction, numbers, or distribution of 
that species.”). 
 76. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Thomas v. Pac. Rivers Council, 514 
U.S. 1082 (1995) (No. 94-1332) (internal citations omitted). 
 77. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A). 
 78. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4)-(c); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i). Service must issue an 
ITS if its biological opinion concludes no jeopardy to listed species or adverse 
modification of critical habitat will result from the proposed action, but the 
action is likely to result in incidental takings. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4)-(c); 50 
C.F.R. § 402.14(i). As long as any takings comply with the terms and conditions 
of the ITS, the action agency is exempt from penalties for such takings. 16 
U.S.C. § 1536(o)(2). 
 79. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(o)(2). 
 80. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(A) (noting that the otherwise prohibited act 
must be for scientific purposes or to enhance the propagation or survival of the 
affected species). 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss1/4
4_KANATAS&SMITH FINAL 8/24/2015  12:06 PM 
2015 ESA: REINITIATED CONSULTATION 239 
 
required to follow the terms of an ITS or ITP, they frequently 
choose to do so in light of section 9’s stringent liability 
provisions.81 
The ESA’s implementing regulations provide a structure for 
section 7 consultation, which is highly complex, lengthy and often 
the subject of litigation.82  Nonetheless, the FWS and NMFS have 
guidance on this process.83 Agencies have also developed 
guidance to work through the consultation process.84 
D.  ESA’s Implementing Regulations for Reinitiated 
Consultation 
In contrast to the complex initial consultation regulations 
and process, the Service has promulgated a single and specific 
regulation governing reinitiated consultation. Specifically, 50 
C.F.R. § 402.16 provides: 
Reinitiation of formal consultation is required and shall be 
requested by the Federal agency or by the Service, where 
discretionary Federal involvement or control over the action has 
been retained or is authorized by law and: 
 
 81. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 170-71 (1997) (noting that agencies 
disregard the terms of an ITS at their peril). 
 82. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.10-402.16; see Root, supra note 7, at 1036 (describing 
the section 7 consultation process as complex, lengthy, and highly litigated). 
 83. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., 
ENDANGERED SPECIES CONSULTATION HANDBOOK: PROCEDURES FOR CONDUCTING 
CONSULTATION AND CONFERENCE ACTIVITIES UNDER SECTION 7 OF THE 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (1998) [hereinafter CONSULTATION HANDBOOK]; see 
also Endangered Species Act Policies, Guidance, and Regulations, NAT’L OCEANIC 
& ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/laws/esa/policies.htm (last 
updated Oct. 10, 2014) (providing links to guidance documents and policies on 
section 7 Consultation, among other things). The section 7 Consultation 
Handbook provides additional guidance on reinitiated consultation. See infra 
Part II.D. 
 84. See, e.g., Paul Weiland, Corps of Engineers Issues Guidance Regarding 
Section 7(a)(2) Consultation, ENDANGERED SPECIES L. & POL’Y (July 23, 2013), 
http://www.endangeredspecieslawandpolicy.com/2013/07/articles/consultation-
2/corps-of-engineers-issues-guidance-regarding-section-7a2-consultation/ 
(discussing June 11, 2013 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ESA Guidance 
memorandum); see also OFFICE OF ENERGY PROJECTS, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY 
COMM’N, HYDROPOWER LICENSING AND ENDANGERED SPECIES: A GUIDE FOR 
APPLICANTS, CONTRACTORS, AND STAFF (2001), available at http://www.ferc.gov/ 
industries/hydropower/gen-info/guidelines/esa_guide.pdf (FERC’s guidance). 
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(a) If the amount or extent of taking specified in the incidental 
take statement is exceeded; 
(b) If new information reveals effects of the action that may affect 
listed species or critical habitat in a manner or to an extent not 
previously considered; 
(c) If the identified action is subsequently modified in a manner 
that causes an effect to the listed species or critical habitat that 
was not considered in the biological opinion; or 
(d) If a new species is listed or critical habitat designated that 
may be affected by the identified action.85 
Thus, although reinitiated consultation is a powerful 
concept—even after the agency acts, it still has requirements86 to 
consult potentially years or decades later—this power is limited. 
The text of 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 clarifies that the requirement to 
reinitiate consultation is only triggered when several precursors 
are met. Specifically, reinitiated consultation under 50 C.F.R. § 
402.16 presumes the following: (1) there has been an agency 
action; (2) the agency has retained discretionary involvement or 
control over the action or such discretionary involvement or 
control is authorized by law; and (3) a triggering event under 50 
C.F.R. § 402.16 has occurred.87 
1. An Agency Action Prompting Initial Consultation 
Reinitiation of formal consultation presumes that there has 
been an agency action. The ESA states that section 7 applies to 
“any action authorized, funded, or carried out” by a federal 
agency.88  The ESA’s implementing regulations give examples of 
what constitutes such agency action. Specifically, 50 C.F.R. § 
402.02 notes that agency action includes: “(a) actions intended to 
 
 85. 50 C.F.R. § 402.16(a)-(d) (2014). 
 86. Interagency Cooperation—Endangered Species Act of 1973, as Amended, 
51 Fed. Reg. 19,926, 19,956 (June 3, 1986) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 402) 
(acknowledging that NMFS and FWS cannot require Federal agencies to 
reinitiate consultation). 
 87. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.16. One might assume that another presumption 
would be a previous formal consultation, since the text of the regulation is 
reinitiation of formal consultation (emphasis added). However, as discussed 
infra in note 99, courts have reasoned that reinitiation of consultation may be 
required even where there was only previously informal consultation. 
 88. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012). 
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conserve listed species or their habitat; (b) the promulgation of 
regulations; (c) the granting of licenses, contracts, leases, 
easements, rights-of-way, permits, or grants-in-aid; or (d) actions 
directly or indirectly causing modifications to the land, water, or 
air.”89  But the ESA’s implementing regulations then go on to 
expressly limit the scope of what constitutes agency action, and 
therefore what types of agency actions trigger section 7’s 
consultation requirement, to those actions “in which there is 
discretionary Federal involvement or control.”90  Therefore, initial 
consultation is required when an agency has taken an 
affirmative, discretionary action.91 
2. Discretionary Involvement or Control 
In considering whether an agency has taken such an action, 
courts first analyze whether a federal agency affirmatively 
authorized, funded, or carried out the underlying activity. If so, 
courts then determine whether the agency had some discretion to 
influence or change the activity for the benefit of a protected 
species.92  If the agency lacks the discretion to influence actions 
that affect listed species, then section 7 is not triggered. For 
example, in National Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of 
Wildlife93 the Supreme Court held that in light of the its 
implementing regulations, the ESA is not triggered where an 
agency is required by statute to undertake an action once certain 
specified triggering events have occurred.94  The Court found the 
Service reasonably determined that the ESA is not an affirmative 
 
 89. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. This list is only illustrative, not exhaustive; 
“[e]xamples include, but are not limited to” the listed actions in 402.02(a) – (d). 
Id. Thus, the definition of “agency action” under the ESA differs from the 
definition under the Administrative Procedure Act, which defines action to 
include a failure to act. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2012). 
 90. 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (emphasis added); see also Nat’l Ass’n of Home 
Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 666 (2007). 
 91. See Karuk Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 681 F.3d 1006, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 
2012) (en banc), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1579 (2013); see also W. Watershed 
Projects v. Matejko, 468 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 92. See Karuk, 681 F.3d at 102; Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502, 1507 
(9th Cir. 1995). 
 93. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 673. 
 94. Id. 
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grant of authority to effectively add another “entirely separate 
prerequisite” to agency action, such as a requirement to consult 
on the impact to listed species.95  In deciding whether an agency 
has retained discretionary involvement or control over the action 
to reinitiate consultation based on the listing of a new species, 
courts have also held that the agency’s control must inure to the 
benefit of the newly listed species.96 
3. Agency Retains Discretion or Control and A 
Triggering Event Under § 402.16 Occurs 
Once the Federal action is completed, reinitiated consultation 
can only occur if the agency retains discretionary involvement or 
control over the action and a triggering event under 50 C.F.R. § 
402.16 occurs. These triggering events are: “(a) if the incidental 
take is exceeded, (b) if new information reveals unanticipated 
impacts on listed species or habitat, (c) if the action is 
subsequently modified in a way that now impacts listed species or 
habitat, or (d) if a new species or habitat is listed that may be 
affected by the action.”97  If reinitiation of consultation is 
triggered, then the Service must issue a new BiOp before a 
project may go forward.98  Notably, each of the events in 50 
 
 95. Id. at 671. 
 96. Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Simpson Timber Co., 255 F.3d 1073, 1080 (9th 
Cir. 2001) (reaffirming test laid out in Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502 (9th 
Cir. 1995)). 
 97. Root, supra note 7, at 1039, n.41 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 (2014)). 
 98. Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 954 F.2d 1441, 1451 (9th Cir. 
1992). Another interesting question concerns whether the agency must have 
initially completed formal consultation for § 402.16 to apply. The Tenth Circuit 
indirectly addressed this question in Center for Native Ecosystems v. Cables. Ctr. 
for Native Ecosystems v. Cables, 509 F.2d 1310 (2d Cir. 2007). The concurring 
opinion found that because the FWS and Forest Service never entered formal 
consultation, by virtue of a “not likely to adversely affect” finding, there was no 
consultation to reinitiate under § 402.16. Id. at 1334 (Briscoe, J., concurring). 
While the majority ostensibly took no position on this argument, the majority’s 
reasoning clearly suggests that they would require agencies to revisit informal 
consultations, at least those concluding in a not likely to adversely affect 
finding. Cables, 509 F.3d at 1324-25, n.2 (noting that reinitiated consultation 
would be required if a not likely to adversely affect finding “required utilization 
levels to be met to remain valid” and new information showed that the levels 
were not met). The District Court for the Virgin Islands has also opined that the 
Service could reinitiate informal consultation. Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. FEMA, 
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C.F.R. § 402.16 would trigger formal consultation initially, as 
each may adversely affect a listed species or habitat. Thus, each 
of these events logically trigger reinitiated consultation because 
the previously issued biological opinion is no longer consistent 
with the current circumstances.99 
III. REINITIATED CONSULTATION’S SIGNIFICANCE 
From a conservation standpoint, reinitiated consultation 
serves a pivotal role within the ESA. In passing the ESA, 
Congress plainly intended to provide the highest level of 
protection to listed species. But, Congress also provided for ITSs, 
which authorize taking listed species in some limited 
circumstances.100  However, without reinitiated consultation, 
ITSs could become blank checks, potentially authorizing takes 
that would jeopardize protected species and imperiling Congress’s 
goal of saving species on the brink of extinction. Moreover, 
reinitiated consultation has important legal consequences. 
Failure to reinitiate consultation can invalidate ITSs, exposing 
agencies and third parties to section 9 liability.101  The below 
discussion helps explain where reinitiated consultation fits in to 
the ESA process and how it helps serve the ESA’s purpose. 
A. Reinitiated Consultation Serves as the Essential 
Constraint on Incidental Take 
1. Congress Placed the Highest Priority On 
Protecting Threatened and Endangered Species 
The legislative history underlying the ESA consistently 
emphasizes the importance of protecting threatened and 
endangered species to preserve genetic heritage. The House 
 
11 F. Supp. 2d 529, 550 n.31 (D.V.I. 1998). Thus, the stronger view is that 
formal consultation is not a prerequisite to reinitiated consultation, at least 
when the Service previously determined that formal consultation was not 
needed because the action was not likely to adversely affect listed species. 
 99. Root, supra note 7, at 1040. 
 100. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4). 
 101. 16 U.S.C. § 1538. 
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Report accompanying the legislation memorably illustrated the 
high stakes: 
The value of this genetic heritage is, quite literally, incalculable. 
The blue whale evolved over a long period of time and the 
combination of factors in its background has produced a certain 
code, found it its genes, which enables it to reproduce itself, 
rather than producing sperm whales, dolphins, or goldfish. If the 
blue whale, the largest animal in the history of the world, were to 
disappear, it would not be possible to replace it – it would simply 
be gone. Irretrievably. Forever.102 
Congress extolled the value of what humanity stood to lose 
through the accelerating disappearance of species from Earth: 
From the most narrow possible point of view, it is in the best 
interests of mankind to minimize the losses of genetic variations. 
The reason is simple: they are potential resources. They are keys 
to puzzles which we cannot solve, and may provide answers to 
questions which we have not yet learned to ask. 
. . . 
Who knows, or can say, what potential cures for cancer or other 
scourges, present or future, may lie locked up in the structures of 
plants which may yet be undiscovered, much less analyzed? . . . 
Sheer self-interest impels us to be cautious.103 
These quotes demonstrate that, in passing the ESA, 
Congress placed a tremendous value on guarding endangered 
species, a benefit of “incalculable” value to society.104 
2. Reinitiated Consultation as a Needed Check on 
ITSs 
The ESA clearly furthers these considerations through its 
prohibition on taking listed species. But as noted above, the Act 
contains an important exception to this prohibition—the ITS, 
which under certain conditions authorizes takes that would 
 
 102. H.R. REP. NO. 93-412, at 143 (1973). 
 103. Id. at 144. 
 104. See id. at 143. 
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otherwise violate section 9.105  Nonetheless, in allowing for ITSs, 
the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee cautioned, 
“[t]he Committee intends that such incidental takings be allowed 
provided that the terms and conditions specified by the Secretary 
. . . are complied with.”106  Thus, Congress did not intend to 
abandon the rigorous scheme of protection for endangered species 
when it provided for ITSs. Rather, it envisioned that these 
statements would act as limited exceptions to the ESA’s stringent 
protections. Reinitiated consultation ensures that ITSs do not 
metastasize past these limits. 
The Ninth Circuit has explained, “[t]he terms of an [ITS] do 
not operate in a vacuum. To the contrary, they are integral parts 
of the statutory scheme, determining, among other things, when 
consultation must be reinitiated.”107  In addition, “[e]ven a cursory 
review of the regulations governing formal consultation 
demonstrates that [ITSs] supplement [biological opinions], and 
were not meant to stand alone.”108  “Without the ‘no jeopardy’ 
determination contained in the underlying [biological opinion], 
the [ITS] potentially pre-authorizes take for an action that could 
subsequently be determined to jeopardize the existence of an 
endangered species. Such a result would be contrary to the ESA’s 
fundamental purpose.”109  Consequently, if the action results in 
greater takings than those envisioned by the ITS, the action 
 
 105. See supra Part II. 
 106. H.R. REP. NO. 97-567, at 26 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 
2826, 1982 WL 25083. 
 107. Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife, 273 F.3d 1229, 
1251 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added). 
 108. Or. Natural Res. Council v. Allen, 476 F.3d 1031, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007). As 
described above, the Service will only issue an ITS for actions that will “not be 
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of listed species.” CONSULTATION 
HANDBOOK, supra note 83, at 4-45. Typically, the ITS will contain an estimate of 
the amount of takings “anticipated from the action.” Id. at 4-47. By definition, 
these takings take will not “reach the level of jeopardy or adverse modification.” 
Id. at 4-49. Additionally, the ITS must contain terms and conditions that include 
sufficient monitoring requirements to ensure that the Service and action agency 
will know if the project results in takings that exceed the anticipated levels of 
take in the document. Id. at 4-54. 
 109. Allen, 476 F.3d at 1036. 
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agency must immediately stop the action causing the taking and 
reinitiate formal consultation.110 
Thus, the Ninth Circuit has reasonably rejected attempts to 
unhook the ITS from the duty to reinitiate formal consultation. In 
Allen, the FWS argued, “[ITSs] need not allow for reinitiation of 
consultation.”111  Instead, the FWS contended that ITSs “serve 
only to lift [section] 9’s bar on take.”112  But, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that authorizing a take of a listed species without any 
additional limit, “is inadequate because it prevents the action 
agencies from fulfilling the monitoring function the ESA and its 
implementing regulations clearly contemplate.”113  Such a 
reading would effectively “expand the [ITS’s] liability exemptions 
beyond the scope that has been established by Congress and by 
the ESA’s implementing regulations.”114 
3. Reinitiated Consultation Protects the Service’s 
Careful Balance in the Jeopardy Determination 
Moreover, reinitiated consultation protects the jeopardy 
finding itself, which rests on a complex scientific analysis 
conducted by Service’s experts in the biological opinion. In 
deciding whether a federal action will jeopardize any listed 
species, the Service must carefully describe the action and the 
action area;115 the life history, population dynamics, and status 
and distribution of listed species in the area;116 the 
environmental baseline for these species, which is to say the 
current health of these species without regard to the federal 
action;117 the direct and indirect effects of the action;118 and the 
cumulative effects of development on the action area.119  The 
 
 110. Id. at 1034-35. The action agency is the agency proposing an action that 
may affect listed species. 
 111. Id. at 1040. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 1040-41. 
 114. Id. at 1041. 
 115. CONSULTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 83, at 4-15. 
 116. Id. at 4-19 to 4-22. 
 117. Id. at 4-22 to 4-23. 
 118. Id. at 4-23 to 4-30. 
 119. Id. at 4-31 to 4-32. 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss1/4
4_KANATAS&SMITH FINAL 8/24/2015  12:06 PM 
2015 ESA: REINITIATED CONSULTATION 247 
 
Service must then weigh the effects of the action and cumulative 
effects against the current status of the species to determine 
whether the action is likely to jeopardize that species’ continued 
existence.120 
Thus, the Ninth Circuit has noted, “[w]hen reinitiation of 
consultation is required, the original biological opinion loses its 
validity.”121  The regulations require reinitiated consultation 
when the project exceeds the stated level of take in the ITS or 
when new information arises concerning the project or listed 
species in the area.122  Plainly, these are the types of occurrences 
that would call into question the validity of the underlying “no 
jeopardy” finding. 
Therefore, reinitiated consultation acts as an essential limit 
on an ITS, which is the primary exception to the Act’s prohibition 
against harming listed species. Without reinitiated consultation, 
ITSs could effectively be blank checks because they would 
authorize takings of unknown impact, potentially even 
jeopardizing species already facing extinction.123 
B.  The Consequences of Failing to Reinitiate 
Consultation 
While reinitiated consultation is important from a 
conservation standpoint, failure to reinitiate consultation can also 
lead to serious legal consequences for federal agencies and third 
 
 120. Id. at 4-35. 
 121. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 698 F.3d 
1101, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added) (citing Or. Natural Res. Council v. 
Allen, 476 F.3d 1031, 1037 (9th Cir. 2007)). However, the Eleventh Circuit has 
noted, “[t]here is no precedent in our circuit to support Petitioners’ argument 
that [the agency’s] choice to reinitiate consultation with NMFS and FWS 
automatically renders the former biological opinions invalid.” Defenders of 
Wildlife v. Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., 684 F.3d 1242, 1252 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(emphasis added). Because this opinion focused on the agency’s choice to 
reinitiate consultation, as opposed to changed circumstances requiring the 
reinitiation, it does not directly relate to whether an ITS remains valid when 50 
C.F.R. § 402.16 requires consultations. 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 (2014). 
 122. 50 C.F.R. § 402.16(a)-(b). 
 123. See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting 
that when the action agency failed to undertake mitigation measures relied on 
by the BiOp, the Service found that the action could jeopardize listed species 
and requested reinitiated consultation). 
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parties. An ESA violation is hardly academic—section 9 
violations can lead to significant civil and criminal penalties, 
including fines and imprisonment. According to the Ninth Circuit, 
an ITS loses its validity when circumstances require reinitiated 
consultation, and the action agency is exposed to potential section 
9 liability until reinitiated consultation leads to a new ITS.124  
Because the ITS represents the primary bulwark against section 
9 liability, federal agencies and licensees have a powerful 
incentive to reinitiate consultation to ensure that the protection 
remains effective.125 
If the federal action is ongoing, either because the federal 
agency is undertaking the action or still deciding whether to 
authorize another’s actions, then the potential for section 9 
liability and the duty to reinitiate consultation is clear.126  But, 
for licensing and permitting actions, the exposure to liability 
under section 9 may remain, even after the licensing action is 
over. Section 9 of the ESA defines “taking” to include actions that 
cause another to take a listed species.127  A number of Circuit 
Courts have interpreted these provisions to include government 
licensing and permitting activities within the definition of a 
“take” under the Act, because the license or permit is a proximate 
cause of the underlying take.128 
 
 124. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 698 F.3d at 1108 (emphasis added) (citing 
Allen, 476 F.3d at 1037). 
 125. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(o) (2012). 
 126. See Cal. Sportfishing Prot. Alliance v. FERC, 472 F.3d 593, 596-99 (9th 
Cir. 2006). 
 127. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1), (g). 
 128. Although this proposition is perhaps counterintuitive, it is the recognized 
law in many circuits, and no circuit has ever held otherwise. See Loggerhead 
Turtle v. Cnty. Council of Volusia, 148 F.3d 1231, 1251-53 (11th Cir. 1998) 
(recognizing the potential for a locality to be held liable under the ESA because 
“a genuine issue of fact exists in this case that the lighting activities of 
landowners along Volusia County’s beaches—as authorized through local 
ordinance—violate the ESA.”); Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 882 F.2d 1294, 
1301 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding that the EPA could be liable under the ESA for 
takings caused by pesticides manufactured by a third party because “the EPA’s 
decision to register pesticides containing strychnine or to continue these 
registrations was critical to the resulting poisonings of endangered species”); 
Damiano, supra note 73, at 1570; cf. Aransas Project v. Shaw, 756 F.3d 801, 819 
(5th Cir. 2014) (demonstrating that while the Fifth Circuit has not found that 
certain licensing actions will trigger section 9 liability, it has clearly 
acknowledged the possibility). 
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In the leading case of Strahan v. Coxe, the First Circuit 
directly addressed the question of whether a permitting agency 
could be civilly and criminally liable under section 9 of the ESA 
for takings committed by its licensees.129  In that case, an 
environmental group sought an injunction under the ESA against 
two Massachusetts agencies on the grounds that the state 
regulation of commercial fishing directly led to the take of 
northern right whales.130  Specifically, the group claimed that the 
use of lobster pots and gillnets as licensed by Massachusetts 
entangled the whales causing distress and death.131 
The First Circuit found, “a governmental third party 
pursuant to whose authority an actor directly exacts a taking of 
an endangered species may be deemed to have violated the 
provisions of the ESA.”132  The court rejected Massachusetts’s 
argument that regulating commercial fishing was no different 
than licensing automobiles or drivers, which plainly does not 
cause a taking under the ESA.133  The First Circuit noted that in 
such licensing actions, the driver’s use of the automobile to 
violate federal law constitutes an intervening cause, breaking 
classic notions of proximate causation.134  In contrast, lobster pot 
and gillnet fishing are so “likely to result in a violation of federal 
law,” that “it is not possible for a licensed commercial fishing 
operation to use gillnets or lobster pots in the manner permitted 
by the Commonwealth without risk of violating the ESA by 
exacting a taking.”135  Several other circuits have also considered 
this question and adhere to this view.136 
 
 129. Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 164 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 130. Id. at 158-59. The name “right whale” itself is a sad reminder of the past 
– the term gained currency because that species was the “right” one to harpoon. 
Right Whale Fact Sheet, N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, http://www.dec.ny. 
gov/animals/9364.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2014). 
 131. Strahan, 127 F.3d at 158-59. 
 132. Id. at 163. 
 133. Id. at 163-64. 
 134. Id. at 164. 
 135. Strahan, 127 F.3d at 164. The First Circuit reaffirmed this view. Strahan 
v. Linnon, No. 97-1787, 1998 WL 1085817 (1st Cir. July 16, 1998). 
 136. See, e.g., Aransas Project v. Shaw, 756 F.3d 801, 819 (5th Cir. 2014); 
Loggerhead Turtle v. Cnty. Council of Volusia, 148 F.3d 1231, 1251-53 (11th Cir. 
1998). 
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Consequently, for federal permitting and licensing agencies, 
the duty to reinitiate consultation may remain an important 
consideration years after the federal action is complete. As noted, 
the Ninth Circuit has indicated that any circumstances requiring 
reinitiated consultation under 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 will invalidate 
the existing ITS.137  But the protections afforded by the ITS can 
be crucial to the agency or its employees for the duration of any 
license or permit issued. Without them, the agency may find itself 
unable to successfully defend against section 9 liability arising 
from the actions of the licensees or permittees. Even for non-
licensing agencies, the ITS can be an important bulwark during 
the duration of the direct federal action, which can take years. 
Therefore, federal agencies face potentially significant 
consequences if they incorrectly evaluate whether circumstances 
warrant reinitiated consultation, as do private parties who are 
also protected by the terms of an ITS. 
C. Conclusions 
When viewed in context, reinitiated consultation is one of the 
most important components of the ESA. Without it, the ESA’s 
entire scheme of protection could collapse through unlimited 
ITSs, which would shield agencies and industries from liability 
long after the species they were meant to protect expired. 
Moreover, failure to properly reinitiate consultation can yield 
dramatic impacts for agencies and third parties. When 
circumstances require reinitiated consultation, ITSs become 
invalid.138  As a result, agencies and licensees lose their 
protections against section 9 liability. Therefore, given the 
important stakes surrounding reinitiated consultation, for people 
and protected animals, it is critical that agencies understand 
when they must reinitiate consultation and the consequences of 
not doing so. Unfortunately, as described below, Congress hardly 
provided a clear roadmap in the ESA for navigating the jungle of 
reinitiated consultation. 
 
 137. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 698 F.3d 
1101, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 138. See supra Part III.B. 
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IV. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY BEHIND REINITIATED 
CONSULTATION 
Despite the importance of reinitiated consultation, Congress 
never explicitly provided for it in statute.139  Thus, the Service’s 
regulation requiring reinitiated consultation140 lacks an overt 
statutory basis.141  Indeed, the Service acknowledged as much in 
the Federal Register notice accompanying the current version of 
the regulation.142  Despite this lack of a statutory basis, no court 
appears to have explicitly addressed the legal basis for reinitiated 
consultation. 
Although the statutory language itself is silent on reinitiated 
consultation, it also does not contain language limiting an 
agency’s ESA obligations to one consultation or restricting 
consultation to the pendency of the federal action. Rather, it only 
states, “[e]ach Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with 
the assistance of the Secretary, insure that any action authorized, 
funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to 
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species.”143  
This ambiguity over the scope and frequency of consultation could 
justify resorting to the legislative history to determine whether 
the Service’s interpretation of reinitiated consultation in 15 
C.F.R. § 402.16 is reasonable.144  On balance, that legislative 
history suggests that Congress understood reinitiated 
 
 139. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2012) (extensively discussing consultation but 
never mentioning reinitiated consultation). 
 140. 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 (2014). 
 141. 16 U.S.C. § 1536. 
 142. In response to a comment on the proposed reinitiated consultation 
regulation, 50 C.F.R. § 402.16, the Service acknowledged “its lack of authority to 
require Federal agencies to reinitiate consultation if they choose not to.” 
Interagency Cooperation—Endangered Species Act of 1973, as Amended, 51 
Fed. Reg. 19,926, 19,956 (June 3, 1986) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 402). In 
contrast, the Service generally has power to bring enforcement actions against 
any entity, including other agencies, for noncompliance with any provision of the 
ESA itself. 16 U.S.C. § 1538. 
 143. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). In fact, the ESA does not further define the terms 
“action,” “authorized,” “funded,” or “carried out.” 16 U.S.C. § 1532. 
 144. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 
(1984) (noting that when the meaning of a statute is unclear, a court will defer 
to the interpretation of the expert agency charged with administering that 
statute). 
27
4_KANATAS&SMITH FINAL 8/24/2015  12:06 PM 
252 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  32 
 
consultation to be a part of the section 7 process. Consequently, if 
courts were to consider the legal basis for reinitiated 
consultation, the legislative history would provide significant 
support for reinitiated consultation. 
A. The Legislative History Assumes Reinitiated 
Consultation Will Occur 
In a House Report accompanying the 1982 amendments to 
the ESA, which added the provisions regarding ITSs, the 
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries explicitly 
addressed reinitiated consultation. It stated, “[i]f the specified 
impact on the species is exceeded, the Committee expects that the 
Federal agency or permittee or licensee will immediately 
reinitiate consultation since the level of taking exceeds the 
impact specified in the initial Section 7(b)(4) statement.”145  The 
report continued, “[i]n the interim period between the initiation 
and completion of the new consultation, the Committee would not 
expect the Federal agency or permittee or licensee to cease all 
operations unless it was clear that the impact of the additional 
taking would cause an irreversible and adverse impact on the 
species.”146 
This statement contains a number of notable assumptions. 
Most obviously, this portion of the legislative history establishes 
that the Committee undeniably envisioned reinitiated 
consultation as part of the ESA. Moreover, it confirms that the 
duty to reinitiate consultation is closely linked to the terms of the 
ITS, as noted by the Ninth Circuit.147  On the other hand, it does 
not mention reinitiating consultation when new information 
shows a greater impact on already-listed species or the Service 
lists a new species in the action area, which indicates that the 
last three components of the reinitiation standard in 50 C.F.R. § 
402.16 may go beyond the Committee’s intent.148  Additionally 
 
 145. H.R. REP. NO. 97-567, at 27 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 
1982 WL 25083. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Or. Natural Res. Council v. Allen, 476 F.3d 1031, 1039 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 148. 50 C.F.R. § 402.16(b)-(d) (requiring reinitiated consultation when a new 
listed species is discovered within the vicinity of the federal action, the federal 
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the description in House Report 567 states that the Committee 
would not ordinarily expect the federal action to cease after 
reinitiating consultation, which suggests that section 7(d)’s bar on 
making an “irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources 
with respect to the agency action” should perhaps not apply 
during reinitiated consultation.149  Last, because the language 
notes that this expectation would also apply to licensees’ or 
permittees’ “operations,” it appears that the Committee 
envisioned reinitiated consultation occurring after licensing 
actions as well as direct federal actions.150 
In 1999 and 2001, two unsuccessful bills aimed at 
reauthorizing the ESA attempted to reform the process for 
reinitiated consultation. In 1999, Representative Young of Alaska 
introduced H.R. 3160, a bill entitled “Common Sense Protections 
for Endangered Species Act.”151  The bill, which had 41 
cosponsors, provided, 
Whenever a determination to list a species as an endangered 
species or a threatened species or a designation of critical habitat 
requires reinitiation of consultation on an already approved 
action, the consultation shall commence promptly, but not later 
than 90 days after the date of the determination or designation, 
and shall be completed not later than 1 year after the date on 
which the consultation is commenced.”152 
In 2001, Senator Smith of Oregon introduced a bill with 
identical language regarding reinitiated consultation.153 
While neither bill was successful, the inclusion of a 
discussion on reinitiated consultation indicates that at least some 
members of Congress accepted it as an established feature of the 
 
action changes, or subsequent information shows a new impact of the action on 
listed species); H.R. REP. NO. 97-567, at 27. 
 149. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d) (2012). See also H.R. REP. NO. 97-567, at 27; but see 
infra note 170 (presents a view to the contrary). 
 150. H.R. REP. NO. 97-567, at 27. 
 151. Common Sense Protections for Endangered Species Act, H.R. 3160, 106th 
Cong. (1999). The accompanying House Report contained little additional 
information regarding the portion of the legislation related to reinitiated 
consultation. H.R. REP. NO. 106-1013, at 13 (2000), 2000 WL 1623050. 
 152. H.R. REP NO. 106-1013, at 46. 
 153. S. 911, 107th Cong., at 55 (2001). 
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section 7 consultation process by 2000. Importantly, while both 
bills represented an attempt to reform reinitiated consultation, 
neither bill questioned its legal basis or sought to provide a 
specific authorization for reinitiated section 7 consultation. In 
addition, both bills expressly mentioned reinitiated consultation 
arising from the listing of a new species or designation of a 
critical habitat, providing additional support for the practice.154 
B. The Scarcity of References to Reinitiated Consultation 
Is Unremarkable 
On the other hand, Congress has considered the ESA on 
numerous occasions and often deliberated extensively on the 
law.155  While this consideration generated hundreds of pages of 
discussion, the only references to reinitiated consultation in the 
Congressional record are the ones discussed above. The paucity of 
references to reinitiated consultation may appear to suggest that 
most members of Congress either did not believe that the ESA 
required it or never considered the question. 
Yet, the dearth of references to reinitiated consultation in the 
legislative history to the ESA may have more to do with how the 
section 7 consultation process evolved than anything else. First, 
reinitiated consultation is integrally tied to ITSs.156  However, 
Congress did not amend the ESA to provide for ITSs until 
1982.157  Thus, for most of the Act’s legislative history, Congress 
would have had little reason to discuss reinitiated consultation. 
 
 154. See H.R. 3160 § 7(a)(8)(B); S. 911 § 4(e)(5)(B). 
 155. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act of 1973, Appropriation Authorization, 
Pub. L. No. 96-246, 94 Stat. 348 (1980); Tellico Dam Rider to the 1980 Energy 
and Water Development Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 96-69, 93 Stat. 437 
(1980); Endangered Species Act of 1973, Appropriation Authorization, Pub. L. 
No. 96-159, 93 Stat. 1225 (1979); Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, 
Public L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751 (1978); Endangered Species Act, Extension of 
Appropriation Authorization, Pub. L. No. 95-212, 91 Stat. 1493 (1977); 
Endangered Species Act, Appropriation Authorization Extension, Pub. L. No. 
94-325, 90 Stat. 724 (1976); Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 
87 Stat. 884 (1973). 
 156. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 157. An Act to authorize appropriations to carry out the provisions of the 
Endangered Species Act of 1973 for fiscal years 1983, 1984, and 1985, and for 
other purposes, Pub. L. No. 97-304, § 4(b)(4), 96 Stat. 1411 (1982). 
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Second, the entire section 7 consultation process came to 
occupy an increasingly prominent role as the Act developed. In 
1979, the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries 
extensively discussed the history and current state of section 7 
consultation.158  The Committee noted, “[t]his one small section 
has developed into one of the most significant portions of the 
entire statute.”159  “Although section 7 has been in effect since 
1973, this consultation procedure was not formally instituted 
until January of [1979].”160  The Report noted that from the time 
Congress enacted the ESA in 1973 to 1979, the Service conducted 
approximately 4,500 consultations, which largely consisted of 
informal discussions between the Service and Federal 
agencies.161  Many of these discussions may have consisted of 
only a simple telephone call.162  However, by 1979, with formal 
consultation procedures in place, the Committee expected that 
the Service could engage in 20,000 consultations in one year.163 
Moreover, the Report indicates that the Committee came to 
see section 7 consultation as a pragmatic way to balance the strict 
conservation goals of the Act with economic development. The 
Committee noted that “the celebrated snail darter case,” TVA v. 
Hill, had interpreted section 7 to prohibit completing any federal 
project that could jeopardize a listed species.164  But, the 
Committee found that the “popular press has grossly exaggerated 
the potential for conflict under the Act” between conservation 
goals and development.165  Rather, the Committee concluded that 
“in many instances good faith consultation between the acting 
agency and the [Service] can resolve many endangered species 
conflicts.”166  Thus, the legislative history underlying the Act 
indicates that section 7 in general, and the consultation process 
in particular, came to assume a more prominent place in the 
 
 158. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1625, at 4-13 (1979), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
9453, 1978 WL 8486. 
 159. Id. at 7. 
 160. Id. at 11. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 12. 
 163. Id. at 11. 
 164. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1625, at 10. 
 165. Id. at 13. 
 166. Id. at 12. 
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protective scheme as time went on. Therefore, the limited number 
of references to reinitiated consultation in the legislative history 
is, perhaps, not as telling as it may initially seem about 
Congress’s views on the topic. Rather, the rarity of discussions 
regarding reinitiation may be expected given the time it took to 
recognize the importance of section 7 consultation. 
C. Congress Has Generally Advanced Conservation Over 
Economic Development 
Additionally, the rest of the legislative history of the ESA 
suggests that reinitiated consultation is consistent with 
Congress’s overall approach to protecting listed species. 
Doubtlessly, reinitiated consultation protects listed species at the 
cost of an economic hardship to federal licensees and permittees 
as well as those who benefit from direct federal action.167  But in 
the 1982 amendments, which established the ITS process, the 
Congress voiced a clear preference for conservation over economic 
development. Specifically, Congress amended the Act to provide 
that the Service shall make listing determinations under section 
4 “solely on the basis of the best scientific and commercial data 
available.”168  The Committee explained that it “strongly 
believe[d] that economic considerations have no relevance to 
determinations regarding the status of species and intends that 
the economic analysis requirements of Executive Order 12291, 
and such statutes as the Regulatory Flexibility Act and the 
Paperwork Reduction Act not apply.”169 
Therefore, on balance, the legislative history supports 
reinitiated consultation. While it only contains a few direct 
references to reinitiated consultation, the existing references 
indicate that Congress understood reinitiated consultation to act 
as an important limit on ITSs. Additionally, given the relatively 
late introduction of ITSs into the act, the scarcity of these 
 
 167. For a vivid description of the potential economic hardships flowing from 
reinitiated consultation, see Root, supra note 7, at 1055-59. 
 168. An Act to authorize appropriations to carry out the provisions of the 
Endangered Species Act of 1973 for fiscal years 1983, 1984, and 1985, and for 
other purposes, Pub. L. No. 97-304, § 2(b), 96 Stat. 1411 (1982). 
 169. H.R. REP. NO. 97-567, at 20 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 
1982 WL 25083. 
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references to reinitiated consultation, which is fundamentally 
connected to ITSs, appears natural. Finally, in the decades-long 
legislative history of the ESA, Congress almost always chose to 
value protecting endangered species over economic development, 
particularly in the 1982 amendments, which introduced the ITS 
and saw the most significant reference to reinitiated consultation 
in the Congressional record. In sum, the legislative history 
supports reinitiated consultation. 
V.  WHAT THE COURTS HAVE TO SAY ABOUT 
REINITIATED CONSULTATION CLAIMS 
As the legislative history and case law makes clear, 
reinitiated consultation serves a similar function to the initial 
consultation requirement in section 7. Namely, it protects species 
and avoids the irreversible or irretrievable commitment of 
resources until consultation is reinitiated and a new biological 
opinion prepared170 or the agency, license or permit applicant 
applies for an exemption, if needed.171  Like initial consultation, 
reinitiated consultation can have a drastic impact on the parties 
involved172 and raises environmental issues that are “rarely black 
or white, usually complex, frequently difficult to delineate, and 
often troubling to resolve.”173 
 
 170. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.09 (stating that after initiation or reinitiation of 
consultation required under section 7(a)(2) of the Act, the Federal agency and 
any applicant shall make no irreversible or irretrievable commitment of 
resources with respect to the agency action which has the effect of foreclosing 
the formulation or implementation of any reasonable and prudent alternatives 
which would avoid violating section 7(a)(2)); Vill. of False Pass v. Watt, 565 F. 
Supp. 1123, 1155 (D. Alaska 1983). 
 171. N. Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 354 (D.D.C. 1980) (finding 
that if after the start of agency action, new information suggests that the action 
may imperil an endangered species, resources may not be granted in violation of 
this chapter, and consultation must begin again). 
 172. See Arthur D. Smith, Programmatic Consultation Under the Endangered 
Species Act: An Anatomy of the Salmon Habitat Litigation, 11 J. ENVTL. L. & 
LITIG. 247, 252-54 (1996) (discussing the Pacific Rivers case and noting that the 
Snake River National Forests are populated only by rural communities that 
depend on logging, mining, and ranching on Federal lands). 
 173. Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 954 F.2d 1441, 1459 (9th Cir. 
1992) (discussing what constitutes a new, unforeseen, or unanticipated 
development). 
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Currently, there is not a considerable amount of case law on 
reinitiated consultation.174  The case law that exists is mostly in 
the Ninth Circuit,175 and only a few other circuit courts directly 
address 50 C.F.R. § 402.16.176  Not surprisingly, other circuits 
rely heavily on the Ninth Circuit case law.177  However, the 
volume of 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 litigation is likely to increase given 
the number of species the Service is considering listing.178 
A careful examination of the case law reveals that despite the 
ESA’s well-founded reputation as the “pit bull” of environmental 
laws,179 courts will normally take a surprisingly deferential 
approach to reinitiated consultation. While courts will carefully 
scrutinize ITSs to ensure that they provide clear criteria for 
triggering reinitiated consultation, when it comes to determining 
if those criteria are met, courts generally defer to an agency’s 
interpretation.180 In particular, courts have declined to require 
reinitiated consultation, even when agency decisions expand the 
scope, size, or duration of the project or substantially alter the 
methodology for calculating when take levels are exceeded.181 
A. You Should Have Done Better: ESA Violations 
In a handful of older proceedings, courts found ESA 
violations based on a failure to properly reinitiate consultation. 
The case summaries below offer action agencies and applicants 
perspective on what they should and should not do to avoid a 
challenge of inadequate reinitiation of consultation. 
 
 174. In contrast, there is a considerable body of case law on listing, initial 
consultation, takes, and other areas of the ESA. See 3 GEORGE CAMERON 
COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUB. NAT. RESOURCES L. § 29:32 (2d ed. 2014). 
 175. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 176. See Waterkeeper Alliance v. Dep’t of Def., 271 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2001); 
Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1035 (8th Cir. 1988). 
 177. See, e.g., Hodel, 851 F.2d at 1035; see also Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. FEMA, 
11 F. Supp. 2d 529, 549-51 (D.V.I. 1998). 
 178. To see a “live” list of candidate species, go to FWS’ species reports. 
Environmental Conservation Online System, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (last 
visited Oct. 29, 2014), http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/. 
 179. See Wilde, supra note 30, at 310. 
 180. See, e.g., Marsh, 816 F.2d at 1388. 
 181. See infra Part V.A. 
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1. Pacific Rivers: FWS’ Programmatics Trigger 
Reinitiation of Consultation 
In Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, the Ninth Circuit 
considered whether the U.S. Forest Service’s programmatics 
(forest plans used to evaluate and authorize specific permit 
applications, also called “land resource management plans”) 
constituted agency actions triggering section 7 reinitiated 
consultation.182  The Forest Service issued the programmatics in 
1990, and NMFS later listed the Snake River chinook salmon as 
threatened.183  Petitioners brought suit and argued that the 
Forest Service must reinitiate consultation on the programmatics 
with the NMFS in light of chinook-salmon-listing.184  The Forest 
Service replied that it was not required to reinitiate consultation 
because the programmatics “are not ongoing agency action 
throughout their duration, but only when they were adopted in 
1990 or if they are revised or amended in the future.”185 
The Ninth Circuit disagreed and reasoned that the 
programmatics themselves “represent ongoing agency action 
throughout their duration” because: 
[land resource management plans] are comprehensive 
management plans governing a multitude of individual projects. 
Indeed, every individual project planned in both national forests 
involved in this case is implemented according to the LRMPs. 
Thus, because the LRMPs have an ongoing and long-lasting 
effect even after adoption, we hold that the LRMPs represent 
ongoing agency action.186 
Importantly, the court ruled that both the site-specific 
actions and programmatics triggered the reinitiation of 
consultation, as both had the potential of injuring a newly listed 
species.187  On remand, the district court granted a preliminary 
injunction of all projects on Forest Service land in Idaho “until all 
 
 182. Pac. Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 183. Id. at 1051. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 1053. 
 186. Id.  
 187. Id. at 1057. 
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questions surrounding [Forest Service] compliance with the ESA 
have been resolved.”188  This injunction affected 342 activities in 
six national forests, including thirty-seven mines with more than 
800 workers.189 
Pacific Rivers is considered a landmark case for several 
reasons.190  First, Pacific Rivers took a broad view of what 
constitutes agency action triggering reinitiated consultation. 
Second, the remedy in Pacific Rivers has been called striking 
because it appears the court ordered the injunctions without 
considering the harm to local communities despite the fact that 
NMFS found that the challenged activities did not threaten 
salmon.191  Pacific Rivers is also illustrative of the high stakes of 
ESA litigation. As in Pacific Rivers, the health of a listed species 
is often balanced with agencies trying to fulfill their statutory 
duties and communities relying on permitted activities for their 
livelihood. Who wins and who loses is not always clear. For 
example, after the protracted litigation in Pacific Rivers, which 
clearly constituted a major victory for the environmental 
movement, the environmental group agreed to stay the injunction 
due to political pressure.192  Given this backdrop, much of the 
reinitiation case law following Pacific Rivers represents an effort 
to limit the scope of reinitiated consultation.193  This withdrawal 
from the high-water mark of Pacific Rivers may explain later 
courts’ surprisingly deferential approach to reviewing agency 
decisions to reinitiate consultation under 50 C.F.R. § 402.16.194 
 
 188. Pac. Rivers Council v. Thomas, 873 F. Supp. 365, 371 (D. Idaho 1995). 
 189. Smith, supra note 172, at 290 n.204. 
 190. Root, supra note 7, at 1035. 
 191. Smith, supra note 172, at 251 (“Pending reconsultation on plans, the 
courts ordered across-the-board injunctions against thousands of ongoing forest 
activities—despite [Forest Service] or NMFS findings that these activities did 
not threaten salmon and without regard to the harm such injunctions would 
cause to local communities.”). 
 192. Id. at 290. 
 193. See Root, supra note 7, at 1036 (“The real attraction of section 7 
reinitiation is not necessarily the protection of endangered species, but a 
powerful incentive to enjoin hundreds of site-specific projects through a single 
programmatic injunction.”). Congress has also proposed bills specifically 
limiting the amount of time available to conduct reinitiation of consultation. See 
S. 911, 107th Cong. (2011); H.R. 3160, 106th Cong. (1999); Root, supra note 7, at 
1062-1064 (discussing H.R. 3160 and S. 911). 
 194. See infra Part V.B. 
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2. Refusing to Reinitiate Can Get You In Trouble 
While the most interesting part of Pacific Rivers is the broad 
definition of agency action that triggers reinitiated consultation, 
at its bottom it is a case where the court found an ESA violation 
because the action agency refused to reinitiate consultation. 
Similarly, in Sierra Club v. Marsh, the court found an ESA 
violation because the action agency refused to reinitiate 
consultation when it failed to successfully undertake mitigation 
measures the Service relied on in issuing the BiOp.195  In Marsh, 
the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the Federal Highway 
Administration were funding the construction of a flood control 
channel and roads in the flood plain of the Sweetwater River.196  
The construction affected the endangered California least tern 
and the light-footed clapper rail.197  The Service’s BiOp identified 
the preservation of 188 acres of nearby wetlands as one measure 
for mitigating the project’s effects.198  When the Corps did not 
acquire these lands,199 the Service determined that the agency 
action was now likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the 
endangered rail and tern.200  The Service requested that the 
Corps reinitiate consultation, but the Corps refused.201  The 
Sierra Club and League for Coastal Protection sued and claimed 
that the Corps violated the ESA by failing to reinitiate 
consultation.202 
The court agreed and held that the Corps’ failure to acquire 
the mitigation lands triggered reinitiation of consultation.203  The 
court reasoned that while the ESA does not give the Service “the 
power to order other agencies to comply with its requests or to 
veto their decisions,”204 ESA section 7 does impose a duty on all 
 
 195. Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 196. Id. at 1378. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 1379. 
 199. Id. at 1380. 
 200. Id. at 1381. 
 201. Marsh, 816 F.2d at 1381. 
 202. Id. at 1381. 
 203. Id. at 1388. 
 204. Id. at 1386 (citing Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359, 371-72 
(5th Cir. 1976); see also Interagency Cooperation—Endangered Species Act of 
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federal agencies to consult.205  The court found that reinitiation of 
formal consultation was triggered in this instance because 
discretionary federal involvement or control over the action had 
been retained and new information revealed that the action could 
affect listed species to an extent not previously considered.206  
Thus, in a handful of instances, courts have found that agencies 
improperly failed to reinitiate consultation – typically when new 
information undermined the validity of the previous consultation, 
such as when a new species is listed or when a planned 
mitigation measure does not occur. 
3. An Inadequate ITS Is Asking for Trouble 
While courts infrequently find ESA violations based on a 
failure to reinitiate consultation, courts are far more likely to find 
ESA violations based on an inadequate ITS. Though these cases 
do not directly pertain to reinitiated consultation, they have a 
close nexus to the topic because the ITSs govern when reinitiated 
consultation is required. 
a. An ITS Not Predicated on a Take Violates the 
ESA 
Several courts have found an ESA violation when an ITS was 
not predicated on an incidental take.207  In Arizona Cattle 
Growers’ Association v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service,208 the Ninth 
Circuit considered ITSs related to the Arizona Cattle Growers’ 
Association’s (ACGA) application for cattle grazing permits in 
Southeastern Arizona.209  The FWS issued a BiOp that analyzed 
twenty species of plants and animals on land within an area 
supervised by the Bureau of Land Management’s (BLM) Saffold 
 
1973, as Amended, 51 Fed. Reg. 19,926, 19,956 (June 3, 1986) (codified at 50 
C.F.R. pt. 402)). 
 205. Id. at 1385 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)). 
 206. Id. at 1387 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 402.16). 
 207. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2), (o) (2012) (noting that the Service may provide 
an ITS when an action will lead to incidental takes). 
 208. Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 273 F.3d 1229 
(9th Cir. 2001). 
 209. Id. at 1233. 
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and Tucson, Arizona, field offices.210  While the BiOp concluded 
that the livestock grazing program “was not likely to jeopardize 
the continued existence of the species affected nor was likely to 
result in destruction or adverse modification of the designated or 
proposed critical habitat,”211 the FWS nonetheless issued an ITS  
for several species of fish and wildlife listed or proposed to be 
listed.212  ACGA and a rancher seeking a grazing permit on the 
lands challenged the ITS on the grounds that it was arbitrary and 
capricious because there was insufficient evidence of an actual 
take to support the ITS.213 
In arguing that the ITSs were appropriate, the FWS claimed 
that the word “taking” in section 7(b)(4) “should be interpreted 
more broadly than in the context of Section 9” given the different 
purposes of the sections (protective vs. punitive, respectively).214  
The Ninth Circuit, like the district court below, rejected this 
argument and stated that the “definition of ‘taking’ in Sections 7 
and 9 of the ESA are identical in meaning and application.”215 
The Ninth Circuit explained that the ESA was amended to 
“resolve the conflict between Sections 7 and 9” and that Congress 
made clear that: 
[the] purpose of Section 7(b)(4) and the amendment to Section 
7(o) is to resolve the situation in which a Federal agency or a 
permit or license applicant has been advised that the proposed 
action will not violate Section 7(a)(2) of the Act but the proposed 
action will result in the taking of some species incidental to that 
action—a clear violation of Section 9 of the Act which prohibits 
any taking of a species.216 
 
 210. Id. (“The Bureau of Land Management’s livestock grazing program for 
this area affects 288 separate grazing allotments that in total comprise nearly 
1.6 million acres of land.”). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id.; see Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 63 F. 
Supp. 2d 1034 (D. Ariz. 1998). 
 214. Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n, 273 F.3d at 1237. The district court had 
already rejected this argument. Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & 
Wildlife Serv., 63 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1044-45 (D. Ariz. 1998). 
 215. Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n, 273 F.3d at 1237. 
 216. Id. at 1239-40 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 97-567, at 26 (1982), reprinted in 
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2826, 1982 WL 25083). 
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Thus, the Ninth Circuit pointed out that “[a]bsent an actual 
or prospective taking under Section 9, there is no ‘situation’ that 
requires a Section 7 safe harbor provision.”217  In fact, the Ninth 
Circuit went so far as to say that the FWS’ interpretation of 
“taking” “would turn the purpose of the 1982 Amendment on its 
head”218 and “would allow the [FWS] to engage in widespread 
land regulation even where no Section 9 liability could be 
imposed.”219  Therefore, the Ninth Circuit, like the district court 
below, held that the FWS acted arbitrarily and capriciously 
because the ESA did not provide the FWS with authority to 
impose conditions on the land when a taking was not present.220 
The Arizona Cattle Growers’ Ass’n court also pointed out the 
FWS’ argument that it “should be able to issue an [ITS] based 
upon prospective harm” was flawed because the ESA’s 
regulations require a separate procedure, i.e., the reinitiation of 
consultation, if different evidence is later developed.221  The court 
stated that “[a]bsent this procedure, however, there is no 
evidence that Congress intended to allow the Fish and Wildlife 
Service to regulate any parcel of land that is merely capable of 
supporting a protected species.”222  Thus, while the ESA does 
provide considerable protection to listed species, potentially at the 
expense of private landowners and others, it does not provide the 
Service unfettered authority to impose conditions on the use of 
land.223 
 
 217. Id. at 1240. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. The court also stated that the FWS’ “handbook instruction to issue an 
[ITS] when no take will occur as a result of permitted activity is contrary to the 
plain meaning of the statute as well as the agency's own regulations.” Id. at 
1242. 
 220. Id. at 1242. 
 221. Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n, 273 F.3d at 1244. 
 222. Id. at 1244. 
 223. While this limit is logically satisfying, it can lead to inconsistent results 
in practice, in light of the dynamic ecosystems in which Federal agencies act. As 
one commenter has noted, for actions that result in an ITS during the section 7 
consultation process, most licensing agencies will simply include a license 
condition implementing the terms of the ITS, which will require reinitiated 
consultation when the circumstances described in 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 are met. 
Root, supra note 7, at 1060; CONSULTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 83, at 6-64. 
As a result, agencies can easily reinitiate consultation on those projects that 
previously received an ITS. But, the Service does not issue a BiOp or ITS for all 
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b. ESA Violation Because ITS Did Not Adequately 
Trigger Reinitiated Consultation 
Even when an ITS is based on a “take,” courts have held that 
the ITS violated the ESA if it did not adequately provide a 
requirement for reinitiated consultation. These findings are 
logical because as explained above and by the Ninth Circuit, the 
purpose of an ITS is to “set forth a ‘trigger’ that, when reached, 
results in an unacceptable level of incidental take, invalidating 
the safe harbor provision, and requiring the parties to re-initiate 
consultation.”224  When the ITS does not fulfill this purpose, the 
purposes of the ESA will not be served. Below are some examples 
of when courts have held that an ITS did not properly provide a 
trigger for the reinitiation of consultation. 
i. The Taking of All is Not a Reasonable 
Trigger 
In Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Allen, the Ninth 
Circuit considered an ITS which allowed taking “all” northern 
spotted owls.225  The court held that ITSs are arbitrary and 
capricious when they allow a take level that is “coextensive with 
the scope of the project” because such statements could never 
trigger the reinitiation of consultation.226  The court explained 
that: 
 
projects, and under the holding in Arizona Cattle Growers’ Ass’n, the action 
agency would logically have no ITS to implement into the terms of the license. 
See Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n, 273 F.3d at 1251; 50 C.F.R. § 402.14 (2014). But, 
due to changing ecosystems, new species can move into the environment of any 
project or the Service can later decide to list existing species within a project’s 
vicinity. Although this could happen anywhere, Arizona Cattle Growers’ Ass’n 
effectively restricts agencies to only reinitiating consultation at those facilities 
with BiOps, because only those facilities will have ITSs giving rise to license 
conditions. Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n, 273 F.3d at 1244-45. While section 9 
liability continues to apply to these facilities, without a license condition 
requiring monitoring and reporting that liability provides greatly reduced 
protection to listed species at facilities without BiOps because the Service’s 
limited resources will likely restrict it from ever learning of these violations. See 
generally Quarles & Lundquist, supra note 38. 
 224. Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n, 273 F.3d at 1249. 
 225. Or. Natural Res. Council v. Allen, 476 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 226. Id. at 1041. 
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[t]he regulations governing Incidental Take Statements also 
provide for ongoing monitoring of incidental take by the action 
agency and the FWS. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i)(3) instructs the action 
agency or applicant to monitor the impacts of incidental take by 
reporting on the project’s impact on the species as specified in the 
incidental take statement. The regulation further instructs the 
action agency to reinitiate consultation immediately if the 
amount or extent of specified take is exceeded in the course of the 
action. The FWS’ own Consultation Handbook terms this point 
“reinitiation level.” Thus, the terms of an Incidental Take 
Statement do not operate in a vacuum. To the contrary, they are 
integral parts of the statutory scheme, determining, among other 
things, when consultation must be reinitiated.227 
The Allen court also noted that Congress clearly intended for 
ITSs to allow for reinitiation of consultation.228  In particular, the 
court noted the House Report which provided the Committee’s 
expectation that if the specified impact on the species is exceeded, 
“the Federal agency or permittee or licensee will immediately 
reinitiate consultation since the level of taking exceeds the 
impact specified in the initial Section 7(b)(4) statement.”229  Thus, 
the court held that an ITS that authorized the take of “all spotted 
owls,” without any additional limit, was inadequate “because it 
prevents the action agencies from fulfilling the monitoring 
function the ESA and its implementing regulations clearly 
contemplate.”230 
ii. Take What? An Unclear ITS Standard Is 
Not a Sufficient Reinitiation Trigger 
Given the ESA’s monitoring function, it is not surprising that 
courts have also held that reinitiation of formal consultation is 
not adequately triggered by an ITS that does not set a clear 
standard for determining when the authorized level of take has 
 
 227. Id. at 1040 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 228. Id. 
 229. Or. Natural Res. Council, 476 F.3d 1040 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 97-567, at 
27 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2827, 1982 WL 25083). 
 230. Id. at 1040-41. The court went so far as to say that such an ITS “reads out 
of the statute” the idea of reinitiation. Id. at 1041. But, as discussed, the idea of 
reinitiation is not in the statute itself. See supra Part IV. 
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been exceeded.231  For example, in Arizona Cattle Growers’ Ass’n, 
the Ninth Circuit considered whether an ITS related to cattle 
grazing on a cow flat allotment under FWS’ control properly 
specified the amount of anticipated take of loach minnow.232  The 
ITS at issue did not provide a specific number of loach minnow; 
instead, it defined the incidental take in terms of habitat 
characteristics. The ITS specified that take would be exceeded if 
several conditions are not met,233 including if “ecological 
conditions do not improve under the proposed livestock 
management plan.”234  ACGA challenged the terms and 
conditions of the ITS, in particular the “ecological conditions not 
improving” condition.235  ACGA asserted that the ITS “fail[ed] to 
 
 231. Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 273 F.3d 1229, 
1251 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 232. Id. at 1249. The Ninth Circuit “agree[d] with the district court that the 
issuance of the Cow Flat Incidental Take Statement was not arbitrary and 
capricious” because the FWS “provided evidence that the listed species exist on 
the land in question and that the cattle have access to the endangered species’ 
habitat. Accordingly, the [FWS] could reasonably conclude that the loach 
minnow could be harmed when the livestock entered the river.”  Id. at 1248. 
However, the Ninth Circuit was considering whether the anticipated take 
provisions were appropriate. The district court had ruled that “neither the 
specificity of the anticipated take provision nor the ‘reasonable and prudent 
measures’ condition was arbitrary and capricious.”  Id. at 1235. 
 233. Id. at 1248-1249. 
 234. Id. at 1249 (quotations omitted). 
 235. The relevant portion of the ITS stated: 
The service concludes that incidental take of loach minnow from the 
proposed action will be considered to be exceeded if any of the 
following conditions are met: 
[Condition 1] Ecological conditions do not improve under the 
proposed livestock management. Improving conditions can be 
defined through improvements in watershed, soil condition, trend 
and condition of rangelands (e.g., vegetative litter, plant vigor, and 
native species diversity), riparian conditions (e.g., vegetative and 
geomorphologic: bank, terrace, and flood plain conditions), and 
stream channel conditions (e.g., channel profile, embeddedness, 
water temperature, and base flow) within the natural capabilities of 
the landscape in all pastures on the allotment within the Blue River 
watershed. 
Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n, 273 F.3d at 1249. 
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specify the amount or extent of authorized take with the required 
degree of exactness.”236 
In considering the take “trigger” in the ITS, the court noted 
that, ideally, the “trigger” should be a specific number.237  
However, the court noted that while preferred, a specific number 
was not required.238  The court pointed to examples where ITSs 
were upheld that used a combination of numbers and estimates 
as a “trigger”239 and cited to legislative reports showing that 
Congress anticipated that a precise number would not always be 
possible.240  The court adopted the reasoning of the district court 
in concluding that “‘the use of ecological conditions as a surrogate 
for defining the amount or extent of incidental take is reasonable 
so long as these conditions are linked to the take of the protected 
species.’”241  In adopting this approach, the Ninth Circuit noted 
that it is consistent with the ESA section 7 Consultation 
 
 236. Id. at 1249-50 (“ACGA argues that it is entitled to more certainty than 
vague and undetectable criteria such as changes in a 22,000 acre allotment's 
“ecological condition.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 237. Id. at 1249 (citing Mausolf v. Babbitt, 125 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 1997) 
(snowmobiling activity may take no more than two wolves)); Fund for Animals v. 
Rice, 85 F.3d 535 (11th Cir. 1996) (municipal landfill may take fifty-two snakes 
during construction and an additional two snakes per year thereafter); Mount 
Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 954 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1992) (telescope 
construction may take six red squirrels per year); Ctr. for Marine Conservation 
v. Brown, 917 F. Supp. 1128 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (shrimping operation may take 
four hawksbill turtles, four leatherback turtles, ten Kemp's ridley turtles, ten 
green turtles, or 370 loggerhead turtles)). 
 238. Ariz. Cattle Growers Ass’n, 273 F.3d at 1249. However, the court noted 
that “[i]n the absence of a specific numerical value . . . the [FWS] must establish 
that no such numerical value could be practically obtained.” Id. at 1250. 
 239. Id. at 1249–50 (citing Ramsey v. Kantor, 96 F.3d 434, 441 n.12 (9th Cir. 
1996) (utilizing both harvesting rates and estimated numbers of fish to reach a 
permitted take)); Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1119 (D. Ariz. 1997) (concluding that an ITS that 
indexes the permissible take to successful completion of the reasonable and 
prudent measures as well as the terms and conditions is valid); Pac. Nw. 
Generating Coop. v. Brown, 822 F. Supp. 1479, 1510 (D. Or. 1993) (ruling that 
an ITS that defines the allotted take in percentage terms is valid)). 
 240. Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n, 273 F.3d at 1250 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 97–
567, at 27 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2827, 1982 WL 25083) 
(“The Committee does not intend that the Secretary will, in every instance, 
interpret the word impact to be a precise number. Where possible, the impact 
should be specified in terms of a numerical limitation.”). 
 241. Id. 
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Handbook, which states that for purposes of an ITS, take can be 
expressed as: 
a change in habitat characteristics affecting the species (e.g., for 
an aquatic species, changes in water temperature or chemistry, 
flows, or sediment loads) where data or information exists which 
links such changes to the take of the listed species. 
In some situations, the species itself or the effect on the species 
may be difficult to detect. However, some detectable measure of 
effect should be provided. . . . [I]f a sufficient causal link is 
demonstrated (i.e. the number of burrows affected or a 
quantitative loss of cover, food, water quality, or symbionts), then 
this can establish a measure of the impact on the species or its 
habitat and provide the yardstick for reinitiation.242 
The court clarified that by “causal link” it meant that the 
FWS must “establish a link between the activity and the taking of 
species before setting forth specific conditions.”243  The court 
rejected the FWS’ argument that the ITS “‘provides for those 
studies necessary to provide the quantification of impacts which 
the [ACGA] claim is lacking.’”244  Instead, the court found that 
the ITS’s analysis that “if ‘ecological conditions do not improve,’ 
takings will occur” was too vague to establish a causal link 
between the condition and the take.245  Additionally, the court 
noted that the vague condition left the Service with “unfettered 
discretion” to determine whether there was compliance with the 
condition, “leaving no method by which the applicant or the 
action agency can gauge their performance.”246  Further, the 
court found that the vague condition imposed a duty on ACGA to 
ensure the “general ecological improvement” of the 22,000-acre 
cow flat allotment.247  Thus, the court held that the 
implementation of the ITS was arbitrary and capricious because 
of the “the lack of an articulated, rational connection between 
 
 242. CONSULTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 83, at 4-50; see also Ariz. Cattle 
Growers’ Ass’n, 273 F.3d at 1250. 
 243. Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n, 273 F.3d at 1250. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at 1251. 
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Condition 1 and the taking of species, as well as the vagueness of 
the condition itself.”248 
Similarly, in Wild Fish Conservancy v. Salazar, the Ninth 
Circuit held that an ITS that lacked adequate monitoring and 
reporting requirements violated the ESA.249  The ITS at issue 
concerned the effects of the Leavenworth National Fish 
Hatchery’s (“Hatchery”) operation and maintenance from 2006–
2011 on the Icicle Creek bull trout, a threatened species.250  
While the ITS set a clear numerical cap on the annual take of the 
bull trout,251 petitioners claimed that the ITS had inadequate 
monitoring and reporting requirements.252  The ITS anticipated 
that 
up to twenty migratory bull trout will be injured each year, 
because Hatchery operations will significantly disrupt their 
breeding behavior by preventing or delaying their spawning 
migration. Yet, the Statement does not require the Hatchery to 
monitor and report the actual number of bull trout so harmed.253 
In considering whether the ITS was adequate, the court 
looked no further than the ESA’s implementing regulations. 
Specifically, the court quoted 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i)(3)254 and 
 
 248. Id. 
 249. Wild Fish Conservancy v. Salazar, 628 F.3d 513, 532 (9th Cir. 2010). In 
this case, the Service was both the action agency and the consulting agency. Id. 
at 518 (“Formal section 7 consultation begins when the ‘action agency’ (here, the 
Service in its capacity as the operator of the Hatchery) transmits a written 
request to the ‘consulting agency’ (here, the Service in its consulting capacity).”); 
see Salmon Spawning & Recovery Alliance v. Gutierrez, 545 F.3d 1220, 1223 
(9th Cir. 2008); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(c) (2014). 
 250. The Hatchery was established to replace salmon “spawning grounds in 
the upper Columbia River made inaccessible by the completion of the Grand 
Coulee Dam, which blocks fish migration.” Salazar, 628 F.3d at 517. 
“Unfortunately, and somewhat ironically, the Hatchery itself blocks fish passage 
in Icicle Creek.” Id. 
 251. Specifically, the ITS set the “the following annual limits on incidental 
take: (1) one bull trout killed and one harmed by the water intake system; and 
(2) twenty migratory bull trout injured because their access to historically 
accessible spawning habitat is impaired, significantly disrupting their breeding 
behavior.” Id. at 530. 
 252. Salazar, 628 F.3d at 531. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. This regulation provides that “[i]n order to monitor the impacts of 
incidental take, the Federal agency or any applicant must report the progress of 
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stated that this regulation “makes clear that the Service is 
responsible for specifying in the [ITS] how the action agency is to 
monitor and report the effects of the action on listed species.”255  
To meet this requirement, the court reasoned that the Service’s 
ITS must either “specify monitoring and reporting requirements 
with respect to the twenty-bull trout limit or, if appropriate, 
select a surrogate trigger that can be monitored.”256  Because the 
ITS did neither, the court held that it did not establish a 
meaningful trigger for reinitiation of consultation.257 
Likewise, in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. 
Evans,258 the district court rejected an ITS that purported to set 
the impermissible level of take at “any individual.”259  The court 
explained that it was extremely unlikely that the taking of a 
single marine animal would actually be detected.260  Therefore, 
the court found that the terms in the ITS did not provide a 
reasonable trigger for reinitiation of consultation.261 
In summary, courts will carefully scrutinize an underlying 
ITS to ensure that it lays a reasonable framework for reinitiating 
consultation. These courts have held that the Service can only 
issue an ITS when the underlying action will actually lead to 
takes. Moreover, these courts have held that while an ITS should 
ideally provide a specific number of takings that will trigger 
reinitiated consultation, the ITS must, at a minimum, provide 
sufficiently clear criteria for reinitiating consultation. But, if the 
ITS provides sufficiently clear criteria for reasonable 
 
the action and its impact on the species to the Service as specified in the 
incidental take statement.” Id. (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i)(3)) (emphasis in 
original). 
 255. Id. at 532. 
 256. Id. at 532 (emphasis in original). 
 257. Id. Judge Fisher dissented in part, but concurred in the majority’s ruling 
on the ITS. Id. at 533, 537 (Judge Fisher “dissent[ed] from Parts II.A, II.B, II.E 
and III. of the majority opinion, but otherwise concur[red].”). 
 258. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Evans, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (N.D. Cal. 
2003). 
 259. Id. at 1187. 
 260. Evans, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1187 (“It is arbitrary and capricious to set the 
trigger at one animal unless defendants can adequately detect the taking of a 
single animal.”). 
 261. Id. at 1184. 
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consultations, courts will seldom second-guess agencies’ decisions 
regarding whether those criteria are met, as described below. 
B. You Did Good! No ESA Violation 
As discussed above in Part V.A, there are multiple precursors 
before reinitiation of consultation is required. As a result, courts 
have frequently found that circumstances did not require 
reinitiated consultation under 50 C.F.R. § 402.16. For example, 
there is no ESA violation if the Service or a private party requests 
an agency to reinitiate consultation, but the agency: (1) lacks 
discretionary authority or control over the project, or (2) the 
circumstances alleged to require reinitiated consultation do not 
meet the four criteria in 50 C.F.R. § 402.16. Further, there is no 
duty to reinitiate consultation if Congress has provided for a 
waiver of ESA requirements for the agency action. 
1. No Discretionary Authority or Control 
a. Sierra Club 
While not formally a reinitiation case, Sierra Club v. 
Babbitt,262 laid the conceptual groundwork for the Ninth Circuit’s 
more limited approach to reviewing 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 in the 
wake of Pacific Rivers.263  In Babbitt, the BLM entered a 
reciprocal right-of-way agreement with a timber company, under 
which the BLM and the timber company could access existing 
roads and build new roads over each other’s land.264  That 
agreement required the timber company to submit a plan for any 
 
 262. Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502 (1995). 
 263. See Root, supra note 7, at 1048-49 (noting that unlike Pacific Rivers, 
Babbitt stressed agency discretion that could benefit a listed species as the key 
element in deciding whether the agency had a duty to consult and also 
describing how this holding would be influential in later reinitiated consultation 
cases). See also Pac. Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 264. Babbitt, 65 F.3d at 1505. Congress authorized these agreements to allow 
the government and private land owners easier access to their own lands in 
light of the “checkerboard pattern of alternating public and private forestland 
ownership.” Id.; see also 43 C.F.R. § 2812.0-3, 2812.0-6 (2014) (explaining the 
current status of the authorization). Originally, the timber company was 
Woolley Logging Company, which subsequently assigned its rights to the Seneca 
Timber Company. Babbitt, 65 F.3d at 1505, 1506. 
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proposed road over BLM land to the agency for approval.265  BLM 
could object if (1) another route was more direct, (2) the proposed 
route “would substantially interfere with existing or planned 
facilities,” or (3) the plan would cause excessive soil erosion.266  In 
addition, the timber company agreed to follow all applicable 
environmental laws and also agreed that the BLM could 
withdraw any approvals if the timber company violated those 
laws.267 
Pursuant to this agreement, the timber company submitted a 
plan to build an 810-foot road over BLM land. Before approving 
the road, the BLM prepared an Environmental Assessment (EA) 
and concluded that the road would lead to logging activities that 
may affect the spotted owl, a listed species.268  But the BLM 
declined to pursue section 7 consultation with the FWS because it 
lacked discretionary authority under the reciprocal agreement to 
modify the proposal for the owl’s benefit.269  The Sierra Club 
sought to enjoin construction of the road on the grounds that 
BLM should have consulted with the FWS on the project.270 
The court considered whether the BLM’s approval would 
trigger initial consultation, as opposed to reinitiated consultation, 
because the BLM entered the reciprocal agreement before 
Congress passed the ESA.271  Nevertheless, because the court 
evaluated when an agency could require further consultation on 
an ongoing Federal project, the case addresses factual 
circumstances identical to most reinitiated consultation 
questions, and the court actually looked to 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 for 
the applicable standard—whether the agency retains 
“‘discretionary Federal involvement or control.’”272  Given the 
BLM’s limited ability to object to a proposed road under the 
reciprocal agreement, the court found that the agency lacked 
 
 265. Babbitt, 65 F.3d at 1505-06. 
 266. Id. at 1505. 
 267. See id. at 1506. Seneca Timber Company agreed to these additional 
environmental conditions when it assumed rights under the reciprocal 
agreement. Id. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Babbitt, 65 F.3d at 1507. 
 271. See id. at 1505. 
 272. Id. at 1509 (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 402.03) (emphasis in original). 
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discretionary involvement or control under the ESA because it 
could not “implement measures that inure to the benefit of the 
protected species.”273  Moreover, the court found that the 
environmental provisions did not provide authority to enter 
consultation because they only allowed the BLM to act if the 
timber company violated the ESA or other environmental law; 
they did not provide the BLM with prospective authority to 
condition the authorization.274  Thus, the Ninth Circuit declined 
to require the BLM to enter consultation with the service on the 
proposed road.275  The court noted that these limits on the 
agency’s authority to condition the authorization distinguished 
the case from Pacific Rivers.276 
b. Environmental Protection Information Center 
v. Simpson Timber Co. 
In Environmental Protection Information Center v. Simpson 
Timber Co. (EPIC), the Ninth Circuit squarely applied the Sierra 
Club framework to reinitiated consultation under 50 C.F.R. § 
402.16.277  In that case, the FWS had previously issued an ITP to 
the Simpson Timber Co. (Simpson) under section 10 of the ESA 
for the northern spotted owl.278  Subsequently, the FWS listed the 
marbled murrelet and the coho salmon as threatened species, 
both of which were potentially affected by Simpson’s logging 
operations.279  The plaintiff, the Environmental Protection 
Information Center (EPIC), sought to enjoin Simpson’s ongoing 
 
 273. Id.; see also Root, supra note 7, at 1049 (noting that the requirement that 
the discretion inure to the benefit of a listed species acts as a further limit on 
reinitiated consultation beyond the text of 50 C.F.R. § 402.16, which only 
requires some discretion or control, regardless of whether it could benefit a 
listed species). 
 274. Babbitt, 65 F.3d at 1510-11. 
 275. Id. at 1509. The dissent found that the ability to object on the grounds of 
whether the route was the most direct could potentially benefit the spotted owl. 
Id. at 1514. 
 276. Id. at 1509 (citing Pac. Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1054-56 
(9th Cir. 1994)). 
 277. Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Simpson Timber Co., 255 F.3d 1073, 1079 (9th 
Cir. 2001). 
 278. Id. at 1074-76. For a discussion of ITPs, see infra Part II.C. 
 279. Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr., 255 F.3d at 1074-76. 
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operations because the subsequent listings required the FWS to 
reinitiate consultation with itself on the ITP.280 
EPIC argued that under Pacific River’s expansive test for 
reinitiated consultation, which required reinitiated consultation 
for any agency action that had an ongoing and lasting effect, 
plainly required the FWS to reinitiate consultation.281  The court 
disagreed with EPIC’s assumption that Pacific Rivers governed 
the outcome. Rather, the Ninth Circuit determined that the ITP 
was closer to the right-of-way agreement in Sierra Club than the 
resource management plan in Pacific Rivers.282  While the plans 
in Pacific Rivers were “comprehensive management plans which 
govern agency action in forest planning decisions,” the ITP, like 
the right-of-way agreement, represented an “agency 
authorization of a private action and a more limited role for the” 
action agency.283  Therefore, the court applied the test from 
Sierra Club and examined whether the FWS retained 
discretionary control over the ITP that could accrue to the benefit 
of the listed species.284 
In applying the Sierra Club test, the Ninth Circuit took a 
surprisingly limited view of the FWS’ discretionary authority 
under the ITP. For example, the ITP provided that “[i]n addition 
to addressing the needs of the spotted owl, Simpson’s [plans will 
modify] silvicultural systems as appropriate to ensure 
compatibility with the habitat requirements of other species.”285  
On its face, this provision appeared to give the FWS authority to 
modify the ITP to benefit the salmon and murrelet, which are 
logically different species than the spotted owl. But, with little 
analysis, the court declared that the language only applied to 
species listed at the time of the ITP, not species subsequently 
 
 280. Id. at 1075. While the request for FWS to consult with itself may appear 
overly technical, the parties agreed that issuing an ITP constituted an agency 
action for purposes of section 7(a)(2). Id. Indeed, the FWS conducted an internal 
consultation process with itself before issuing the initial ITP. Id. at 1077 n.5. 
 281. Id. at 1079 (citing Pac. Rivers, 30 F.3d at 1053). 
 282. Id. at 1080. 
 283. Id (citing Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
 284. Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr., 255 F.3d at 1080. But see Root, supra note 7, at 
1060-61 (noting that this holding does not place a meaningful limit on 
reinitiated consultation because agencies can always choose to include a license 
or permit condition that requires reinitiated consultation). 
 285. Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr., 255 F.3d at 1080. 
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listed.286  Further, the court found that although the terms of the 
FWS’ biological opinion read, “[r]einitiation of formal consultation 
is required if . . . a new species is listed,” the biological opinion did 
not give the FWS additional authority to reinitiate consultation, 
but only restated the language in § 402.16.287  Particularly, the 
court indicated that for an agency to rely on a license or permit 
condition to reinitiate consultation upon the listing of a new 
species, the condition must specifically reserve the agency’s 
discretion to reinitiate consultation upon a new species’ listing.288 
c. Later Cases 
More recently, in San Bernardino Valley Audubon Society v. 
FERC,289 the Ninth Circuit has also indicated that reinitiated 
consultation only applies to an ongoing “action” as defined in 50 
C.F.R. § 402.02.290  Thus, the court determined that FERC need 
not reinitiate consultation on operation of a relicensed 
hydroelectric dam because operation of the dam under the 
Federal permit did not constitute an agency action.291  But this 
result appears contrary to the plain text of 50 C.F.R. § 402.16, 
which requires reinitiation whenever “discretionary Federal 
involvement or control over the action has been retained or is 
 
 286. Id. at 1081 n.6. 
 287. Id. (alteration in original) (similar statements successfully preserve 
discretion for the acting agency when contained in the license or permit). This 
feature of the opinion drew a sharp dissent, which argued that the court’s 
analysis artificially constricted the terms of the ITP to only cover listed species. 
Id. at 1084. 
 288. See id. The Eastern District of California reached this conclusion in 
Natural Res. Def. Council v. Rodgers, 381 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1249 (E.D. Cal. 
2005). There, the court noted that EPIC suggested that “only very specific 
language in permits or contracts explicitly retaining discretionary control to 
benefit protected species” could form the basis for reinitiated consultation. Id. 
Thus, in that case the court found that an agency could not reinitiate 
consultation under 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 when the underlying contract did not 
contain such language. Id. 
 289. San Bernardino Valley Audubon Soc’y v. FERC, No. 05–77186, 242 Fed. 
App'x 462 (9th Cir. July 12, 2007). 
 290. Id. at 469; see 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2014) (actions are “activities or 
programs of any kind authorized, funded, or carried out, in whole or in part, by 
Federal agencies”). 
 291. San Bernardino Valley Audubon Soc’y, 242 Fed. App’x at 469. 
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authorized by law.”292  The word “retained” appears to 
contemplate activities beyond simple ongoing agency action, 
including instances where an action occurs that the Federal 
agency continues to authorize or permit and retains discretionary 
control over.293 
Moreover, San Bernardino Valley Audubon Society relies 
heavily on California Sportfishing Protection Alliance for its 
interpretation of 50 C.F.R. § 402.02.294  However, California 
Sportfishing Protection Alliance did not explicitly address 
reinitiated consultation or 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 and appears to rely 
on a dramatic misreading of 50 C.F.R. § 402.02.295 In California 
Sportfishing Protection Alliance, without any explanation or 
analysis, the Ninth Circuit ignored the definition of agency action 
in 50 C.F.R. § 402.02, and instead found that the four examples in 
the regulation constituted the entire definition of agency action: 
(1) actions to conserve listed species, (2) promulgating 
regulations, (3) granting licenses or contracts, and (4) modifying 
the land, water, or air.296 
Given this reading of 50 C.F.R. § 402.02, the Sportfishing 
court found that operation of a facility under a Federal permit or 
license was not a Federal action.297  But the list in 50 C.F.R. § 
402.02 is explicitly not exclusive, and the regulation states that 
action “means all activities or programs of any kind authorized, 
funded, or carried out, in whole or in part, by Federal 
agencies.”298  Since operation of a hydroelectric dam under a 
FERC license certainly appears to be an action authorized by a 
Federal agency, the Ninth Circuit likely misinterpreted the 
regulation. Consequently, San Bernardino Audubon Society 
 
 292. 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 (2014) (emphasis added). 
 293. See Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr., 255 F.3d at 1074-76 (considering the Service’s 
obligation to reinitiate consultation on a completed, ongoing ITP). 
 294. San Bernardino Valley Audubon Soc’y, 242 Fed. App'x at 469 (citing Cal. 
Sportfishing Prot. Alliance v. FERC, 472 F.3d 593, 597 (9th Cir. 2006)). 
 295. See generally Cal. Sportfishing Prot. Alliance v. FERC, 472 F.3d 593 (9th 
Cir. 2006). 
 296. Sportfishing Prot. Alliance, 472 F.3d 593 at 598-99 (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 
402.02). 
 297. Id. at 599. 
 298. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2014) (emphasis added). Indeed, the regulation 
includes the phrase, “[e]xamples include, but are not limited to.” Id. 
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appears to rest on questionable logic, is not an officially published 
case, and no court has relied on its holding in further interpreting 
50 C.F.R. § 402.16. Thus, it is best considered as an outlier.299 
2. No Changed Circumstances 
Beyond questions of discretionary control over the Federal 
project, courts have frequently upheld agency determinations 
that the triggers in 50 C.F.R § 402.16 are not met. For example, 
in Center for Native Ecosystems v. Cables,300 the Tenth Circuit 
considered whether new information regarding the impact of a 
Federal project, issuing grazing permits, on the Preble’s mouse, a 
listed species, required reinitiated consultation under 50 C.F.R. § 
402.16.301  During the initial informal consultation, the Forest 
Service and FWS concurred that the grazing permits would not 
be likely to adversely affect the mouse.302  As part of that 
concurrence, the agencies agreed to several mitigation measures, 
one of which was a 60.5% limit on forage-utilization.303  During a 
separate-but-related consultation, the FWS and Forest Service 
revisited the mitigation measures and found that grazing 
activities under the permits had exceeded the forage-utilization 
levels in some key areas.304  Nevertheless, the agencies concluded 
 
 299. See Freeman, supra note 9, at 121. Nevertheless, Freeman argues that 
reinitiated consultation should only be triggered by some additional Federal 
action because new species and data on the condition of the species are 
inevitable and will continuously arise. Id. But not all new information is 
significant. For a complete discussion of how courts evaluate new information’s 
significance in the NEPA context, see Maxwell C. Smith and Catherine E. 
Kanatas, Acting with No Regret: A Twenty-Five Year Retrospective of Marsh v. 
Oregon Natural Resources Defense Council, 32 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 329 
(2014). Possibly, the Ninth Circuit’s interest in further limiting the reach of 50 
C.F.R. § 402.16 rests on recognition of the regulation’s uncertain legal basis. See 
supra Part III. 
 300. Ctr. for Native Ecosystems v. Cables, 509 F.3d 1310 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 301. Id. at 1313-14. The Forest Service explicitly retained ongoing control over 
the grazing permits; the permits stated that they could “be cancelled, in whole 
or in part, or otherwise modified, at any time . . . to conform with needed 
changes brought about by law, regulation,” or other circumstances. Id. at 1313. 
 302. Id. at 1315. 
 303. Id. (stating the agencies initially agreed to a 40-45% level but later 
agreed to the increase). 
 304. Id. at 1317. 
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that overall, the average utilization rate was below the 60.5% 
limit.305 
The Center for Native Ecosystems (CNE) alleged that the 
Forest Service should have reinitiated consultation under 50 
C.F.R. § 402.16(b) and (c) because the exceeded forage-utilization 
showed a previously unconsidered effect on the mouse and a 
modification to the project that impacted the mouse.306  CNE 
acknowledged that the Forest Service had found the average 
forage-utilization within limits in all allotments, but CNE argued 
that this measurement rested on an arbitrary policy change.307  
CNE argued that previously, the Forest Service had measured 
each key area separately and only recently switched to an 
averaging method.308 
The court responded that the biological assessment did not 
specify that the Forest Service would use data from key areas, as 
opposed to data averaged over an entire allotment, to evaluate 
whether authorized activities exceeded the forage utilization 
standards.309  In any event, the court noted that agencies always 
retain discretion to change methodology on a reasoned basis.310  
In this case, the court found that the agency’s preference of 
averages over an entire allotment was reasonable given the 
potential for measures of isolated key areas to prove 
misleading.311  Thus, Cables illustrates the substantial discretion 
agencies have in determining whether a mitigation measure, or 
potentially a term of an ITS, has been exceeded. Not only will 
courts defer to an agency’s method of calculating the impact on a 
listed species, but courts may also give agencies considerable 
flexibility in altering those methods. 
Several district courts have also taken a deferential approach 
to reviewing an agency’s determination on the reinitiation criteria 
 
 305. Id. at 1315, 1318. 
 306. Ctr. for Native Ecosystems, 509 F.3d at 1324-25. 
 307. Id. 
 308. Id. at 1325-26. 
 309. Id. at 1326. 
 310. Id. at 1327 (citing Exxon Corp. v. Lujan, 970 F.2d 757, 762 n.4 (10th Cir. 
1992)) (“Changes in policy can be upheld when such change is explained with a 
reasoned analysis.”). 
 311. Id. 
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in 50 C.F.R. § 402.16.312  For example, the Eastern District of 
California found that even though the Service listed a new 
species, the red-legged frog, in a project’s vicinity, the agency’s 
reasonable determination that the project would have no effect on 
the frog relieved the agency from any further duty to consult.313  
Similarly, the District Court for the Virgin Islands concluded that 
50 C.F.R. § 402.16 did not require FEMA to reinitiate 
consultation on an emergency housing project when the agency 
extended the duration of the project from six to eighteen 
months.314  There, the petitioner did not show that the extension 
would harm listed species and the duration of the project was not 
instrumental to the Service’s previous finding.315 
Likewise, one District Court found that the impacts of white-
noise syndrome on the Indiana Bat did not require the Forest 
Service to reinitiate consultation on a forest management plan 
when the available evidence showed that the bat had not been 
negatively impacted and the population had, in fact, grown by ten 
percent.316  In addition, the District Court for the District of 
Columbia found that the Forest Service did not need to reinitiate 
 
 312. In these cases, the plaintiff bears the burden of producing evidence to 
show that the 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 criteria require reinitiated consultation. See 
Oceana, Inc. v. Byson, 940 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1061-62 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
 313. Protect Our Water v. Flowers, 377 F. Supp. 2d 844, 877 (E.D. Cal. 2004) 
(quotations omitted). In that case, the Army Corps of Engineers preserved 
discretion and control over an ongoing residential development product through 
a clause in a dredge and fill permit that allowed the Corps to “reevaluate its 
decision on this permit at any time the circumstances warrant.” Id. at 855 
(internal citations omitted). Strikingly, despite several requests from the Service 
to reinitiate consultation, the Court disagreed with the Service’s claims that 
new information, changes to the project, and violations of the limits in the ITS 
required reinitiated consultation under 50 C.F.R. § 402.16. Id. at 856-57, 873-76. 
Specifically, the court concluded that sightings of listed species within the 
project area did not constitute new information when the biological opinion 
noted the presence of the species in the vicinity, that an appreciably greater 
spatial impact on the habitat of a listed species than initially thought was only a 
minor modification to the project, and that speculation from the Service that the 
project exceeded the incidental take levels did not suffice to trigger reinitiated 
consultation. Id. at 874-76. 
 314. Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 11 F. Supp. 2d 
529, 550 (D.V.I. 1998). 
 315. Id. at 550. 
 316. Heartwood, Inc. v. Agpaoa, 611 F. Supp. 2d 675, 692-93 (E.D. Ky. 2009), 
rev’d on other grounds, 628 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 2009). 
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consultation on oil and gas leases to account for new information 
showing the leases would affect more grizzly bears than originally 
thought.317  The court noted that the underlying biological 
opinion explicitly recognized the importance of the area to grizzly 
bears and the uncertainty of the number of grizzly bears in the 
area.318  Thus, courts have upheld agencies’ determinations not to 
reinitiate consultation even when the agency changes the 
methodology for determining impacts on species, triples the 
duration of a project, or learns that the project may impact many 
more members of the species than initially thought. Overall, 
these cases suggest that when new circumstance do not 
significantly change the underlying reasoning in the biological 
opinion or the ITS, courts will not likely find a duty to reinitiate 
consultation. 
3. Congress Intervention Establishing That 
Reinitiation Is Not Required 
Congress can also step in and create laws that remove any 
requirement to reinitiate consultation. Such was the case in Mt. 
Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan.319  As the Ninth Circuit 
stated, Red Squirrel is a case about the “conflict between those 
who would build bigger and better telescopes and those who 
would shelter the endangered Mount Graham red squirrel from 
the destruction of its habitat.”320 
This conflict involved the Sierra Club, a number of Federal 
agencies, and Congress. In this case, there was considerable delay 
in getting telescopes built on Mt. Graham, the critical habitat of 
the endangered red squirrel.321  Given the delay and the desire to 
build the telescopes, Congress interceded and enacted the 
Arizona–Idaho Conservation Act.322  The Act provided for a two-
phase building project and appeared to state that the ESA was 
deemed satisfied as to the first phase.323 
 
 317. Wyo. Outdoor Council v. Bosworth, 284 F. Supp. 2d 81, 95 (2003). 
 318. Id. 
 319. Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 954 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 320. Madigan, 954 F.2d at 1443. 
 321. Id. 
 322. Id. 
 323. Id. at 1446. 
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Environmental groups raised multiple challenges, including 
a challenge that the first phase of construction triggered the need 
to reinitiate consultation.324  To determine if reinitiated 
consultation was required, or if the ESA was deemed satisfied, 
the court looked first to the Arizona–Idaho Conservation Act, 
which it determined was ambiguous on the point.325  Given this, 
the court looked to legislative history to determine if Congress 
had in fact meant to waive ESA requirements with respect to the 
first phase of construction.326  The court found that the legislative 
history, although limited, clearly suggested “Congress intended 
that the first three telescopes be built immediately, without being 
subject to the possibility of delay inherent in any reinitiation of 
consultation.”327  Thus, the court stated “the requirements of 
Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act are deemed satisfied as 
to the entire first phase of construction.”328  The court made clear 
 
 324. Id. at 1447. 
 325. Id. at 1452. 
 326. Madigan, 954 F.2d at 1456-57. Notably, the court did not defer to the 
Service’s interpretation of the statute, because the Service’s position on whether 
the statute contemplated reinitiated consultation changed. Specifically, the 
court stated: 
Prior to the initiation of the present litigation, the Forest Service 
indicated its belief that the Arizona–Idaho Conservation Act 
permitted the reinitiation of consultation regarding the first phase of 
construction. Subsequent to the filing of this lawsuit, the agency's 
position changed. Given this fluctuation over the course of two years, 
we decline to rely on the Forest Service's “expertise.” 
Id. at 1457. 
 327. Id. at 1453. The court also included excerpts of statements made on the 
floor of the Senate. “Three telescopes will be built immediately. They can no 
longer be stalled by process, by litigation, or by whim. Four telescopes can be 
built in the future after a timely conclusion to the [Environmental Impact 
Statement] and consultation between Fish and Wildlife, Forest Service, and the 
University of Arizona.” Id. at 1454 (citing 134 CONG. REC. 15,741 (daily ed. Oct. 
13, 1988) (statement of Sen. McCain)). Interestingly enough, two years after the 
statute was enacted, the same speaker said “[w]e have always believed that the 
Arizona–Idaho Conservation Act contemplated the possibility of reinitiation of 
consultation where new information has been found.” Id. at 1456. These 
statements lend further support to the conclusion in section IV that despite the 
ESA’s silence on reinitiated consultation, Congress has long understood 
reinitiated consultation to be an established and important part of the ESA’s 
statutory scheme. 
 328. Id. at 1456. 
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that this waiver did not apply to the second phase of construction 
(i.e., the final four telescopes): 
The fact that Congress made authorization of the final four 
telescopes contingent on an evaluation of the impact on the red 
squirrel of construction of the first three telescopes also indicates 
that the legislators sought to achieve a workable and practical 
compromise between the needs of the scientific community on the 
one hand and the legitimate concerns of the environmentalists on 
the other.329 
Given this reading of the Act, the court affirmed the district 
court’s summary judgment on Sierra Club’s reinitiation claims. In 
particular, the court held that Sierra Club’s claims that 
reinitiation was required given new information were irrelevant 
due to the waiver.330 
In Tinoqui-Chalola Council of Kitanemuk and Yowlumne 
Tejon Indians v. U.S. Department of Energy,331 the Ninth Circuit 
also found that the Department of Energy (DOE) need not 
reinitiate consultation when a statute required the agency to sell 
a specific oil field and explicitly provided that the existing BiOp 
and ITS would transfer to the purchaser.332  The court found that 
by specifying that the ITS would accompany title to the oil field, 
Congress explicitly intended to excuse the DOE from its duty to 
reinitiate consultation on the action.333  Moreover, the court 
agreed with the DOE that requiring reinitiated consultation 
under these circumstances would serve no purpose because, by 
law, the transferee would still operate the oil field in accordance 
with the ITS and would therefore not generate any new impacts 
on listed species.334  Thus, the Ninth Circuit has also declined to 
 
 329. Id. at 1458. 
 330. Id. at 1448-49, 1460, 1461 (discussing “reconsultation claims” associated 
with the “Summary Judgment Appeal” and the “Jurisdictional Appeal”). 
 331. Tinoqui-Chalola Council of Kitanemuk & Yowlumne Tejon Indians v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 232 F.3d 1300 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 332. Tinoqui-Chalola Council of Kitanemuk & Yowlumne Tejon Indians, 232 
F.3d at 1302, 1303, 1308-09 (citing National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, § 3412(a), 110 Stat. 186, 631)). 
 333. Id. at 1309. 
 334. Id. 
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require consultation when legislation clearly overrides agency 
discretion to implement the terms of an ITS. 
C. Conclusions 
While reinitiated consultation poses important 
considerations for action agencies and practitioners, courts have 
seldom found that agencies improperly refused to reinitiate 
consultation. Recently, courts have typically taken a deferential 
view toward agency interpretations of 50 C.F.R. § 402.16. 
Nevertheless, courts will carefully scrutinize ITSs to ensure that 
they contain reasonable triggers for reinitiated consultation. As a 
result, practitioners and agencies would be well advised to ensure 
that ITSs are adequate at the time the agency undertakes a 
proposed action. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A request for reinitiated consultation need not end in a 
catastrophe for either a listed species or an agency or permittee. 
While courts have readily assumed firm legal ground for 
reinitiated consultation, the statute is actually silent on this 
count. Fortunately the legislative history and clear policy ends of 
the ESA support the practice. As described above, courts will 
typically require reinitiated consultation when it is within the 
action agency’s discretionary authority and one of the reinitiated 
criteria in 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 are clearly met. While courts will 
carefully scrutinize underlying ITSs to ensure that they provide 
meaningful criteria for reinitiating consultation, courts normally 
adopt a deferential approach to agency determinations of whether 
the 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 criteria are met. In these circumstances, 
reinitiated consultation may actually further the ends of the 
agency and applicant, in that it will ensure that the protections of 
any ITS remain valid or that any needed ITS is adopted. 
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